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ABSTRACT
Employees are the lost souls of bankruptcy regulations and Chap-
ter 11 in particular. Although the reorganization of an industrial op-
eration inevitably entails downsizing and labor force restructuring,
* PhD, London School of Economics; LLM, University of Toronto; Adjunct Lecturer, He-
brew University, Jerusalem; Senior Legal Advisor, Israel Security Authority. I would like to
thank Professor Hugh Collins and Professor Vanessa Finch from the London School of Econom-
ics for their thoughts and assistance. All errors are of course, my own.
347
348 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 10:347
when introduced, Chapter 11 did not address these issues directly.
Because of the inevitable context of industrial disputes, however,
since its enactment the regulations pertaining to employees under
Chapter 11 have developed through legislation, judicial law-making,
and business practices. This paper follows these developments, while
adopting a wider perspective that addresses the issue of corporate
control under Chapter 11's regulated bargaining environment.
Against the backdrop of the determinants that establish the theoreti-
cal, practical, and institutional boundaries of Chapter 11, this paper
explains these developments and assesses the future of employees
under Chapter 11.
I. INTRODUCTION
At first glance, nothing in Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code' re-
quires a special discussion of the issue of company employees-Chap-
ter 11 is simply a collective creditors' enforcement mechanism. Yet
time and time again the issue of labor force restructuring, redundan-
cies, plant relocation, and downsizing, have become the focal point of
the Chapter 11 process. It is quite common, during a Chapter 11 pro-
cedure and before a reorganization 2 plan is approved, for the firm to
sell entire divisions and shut down production lines. Since Chapter
11's enactment in 1978, heavily unionized industries throughout the
country have triggered Chapter 11's automatic stay of proceedings 3
strategically, in order to avoid or alter Collective Bargaining Agree-
ments (CBAs) or retirees' pension plans.4 It was under Chapter 11
that the steel, airlines, car, and other heavily unionized industries,
have annulled their existing CBAs or simply imposed upon their
workforce new terms of employment. In some cases, under Chapter
11's protection, companies relocated their production lines abroad,
prompting and supporting the de-industrialization phenomenon.5
1. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 101, 92 Stat. 2549, 2549 (1978) (codi-
fied at 11 U.S.C. § 101 (2006)).
2. The terms corporate "reorganization" and "restructuring" throughout this paper are used
interchangeably. When referring to "workouts," these are understood as pre-packaged bank-
ruptcy reorganizations only, limited to small restructuring of debt and equity. See Kenneth M.
Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., An Efficiency-Based Explanation for Current Corporate Reorgani-
zation Practice, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 428 (2006).
3. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, § 362 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 362).
4. See KEVIN J. DELANEY, STRATEGIC BANKRUPTCIES: How CORPORATIONS AND CREDITORS
USE CHAPTER 11 TO THEIR ADVANTAGE (2d ed. 1998) (regarding strategic bankruptcies). Some
of the reasons to strategically choose Chapter 11 include gaining competitive advantage by trad-
ing under Chapter 11 or avoiding mass tort liabilities.
5. The reorganization of the steel corporations during the 1980s immediately comes to mind.
A similar process of deindustrialization amongst the automobile suppliers has taken place during
the years leading up to the 2008 credit crisis. In 2007, automobile suppliers such as Delphi Co.,
Tower Automotive Inc., Collins & Aikman Corp., Federal Mogul Corp., and Meridian Automo-
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In other contexts, an employer may discharge an employee, or re-
duce wages, based on the simple explanation that the employer is un-
dergoing reorganization, which is self-evident under Chapter 11.6
Unlike the non-bankruptcy context, however, Chapter 11 establishes a
separate and designated regulated bargaining environment7 and envi-
sions continuous operation, while assuming the cooperation of the
employees. Because Chapter 11 reorganizations also assume the re-
duction of operation costs, including the costs of labor, the scene inev-
itably becomes a charged struggle. Within this context, the power
conferred upon the firm's management, now the Debtor-In-Possession
(DIP)8 over the firm's employees is determined by the boundaries of
the firm's controlling rights.9 These, in turn, are established through
participation rights in the preparation and approval process of the re-
organization plan, as well as the basic characteristics and limits of DIP
discretion. In other words, the position of the firm's controller, its
rights, obligations, and natural alliances, as well as that of the firm's
employees, determine the position of the firm's employees.
Since Congress introduced Chapter 11 in 1978, the regulations per-
taining to this power relation have developed significantly. When in-
troduced, nothing in Chapter 11 addressed either the issue of
collective bargaining, or redundancies more generally. It was assumed
that the general rules governing the contract of employment would
apply within Chapter 11's domain as well. Nonetheless, the reality of
tive Systems Inc., all Michigan based companies, were all under Chapter 11. Production lines
were shut and relocated abroad, mainly to Mexico. See BLUESTONE BARRY & HARRISON BEN-
NETT, THE DEINDUSTRIALIZATION OF AMERICA: PLANT CLOSINGS, COMMUNITY ABANDON-
MENT, AND THE DISMANTLING OF BASIC INDUSTRY (1982) ("By deindustrialization is meant a
widespread, systematic disinvestment in the nation's basic capacity.") See also Arthur S. Alder-
son, Explaining Deindustrialization: Globalization, Failure, or Success? 64 AM. Soc. REV. 701,
701 (establishing deindustrialization as a political choice, the authors find no linear regression
between globalization and deindustrialization across 18 OECD nations during the 1968-1992
period).
6. Travis J. Ketterman, The Impact of Employer's Bankruptcy on Employees, 94 ILL. B.J. 304
(2006). Note, that under the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, an employer
with one hundred or more employees is required to give at least sixty days advance notice before
the employer undertakes a "plant closing" or "mass layoffs." Worker Adjustment and Retrain-
ing Notification Act, §§ 2-5, Pub. L. No. 100-379, 102 Stat. 890, 890-94 (1988) (codified at 29
U.S.C. §§ 2101-04 (2006)).
7. See generally Kevin A. Kordana & Eric A. Posner, A Positive Theory of Chapter 11, 74
N.Y.U. L. REV. 161 (1999) (applying game theory to analyze the Chapter 11 bargaining
environment).
8. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (2000) (dictating rights, powers and duties of a debtor in possession).
9. See generally MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1994) (adopting a wide definition of corpo-
rate control, one that takes into account the various legal and institutional constrains on the
controller's autonomy).
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continuously operating in a climate of financial distress required that
bankruptcy courts deal with precisely these issues. While doing so,
bankruptcy courts reshaped the boundaries of control by continuously
extending managerial discretion and avoided empowering employees
with a voice through any of the various procedural mechanisms of
Chapter 11. In the context of collective bargaining, political pressure
induced the enactment of §§ 1113 and 1114 of the Bankruptcy Code,
which dealt with amending CBAs or retirees' pension plans and re-
quired judicial response. This response was shaped by the unique set-
ting of a distressed firm, the theoretical and practical context of
bankruptcy regulations, as well as the institutional and historical con-
text in which federal bankruptcy courts operate. Ironically, trade un-
ions supported §§ 1113 and 1114 and Congress designed the sections
to protect employees by incorporating the non-bankruptcy collective
bargaining regime.10 However, eventually, these rules only en-
couraged companies to choose to undergo Chapter 11 reorganizations
for the purpose of rejecting existing CBAs and altering pension plans
under their favorable court-made regime."
This Article reviews these developments while examining their ori-
gins and causes. Part II describes the theoretical and institutional set-
ting in which Chapter 11 operates with respect to employee rights. As
described in Part II, the goal of maximizing the firm's value, the desire
to protect the firm as an organ on which various stakeholders depend,
and the institutional context in which federal bankruptcy courts oper-
ate are the most significant factors in shaping Chapter 11's develop-
ment and future.12 As the basis for analyzing Chapter 11's
development and future, the analysis provides a context that goes be-
yond the issue of the firm's employees to the more general context of
corporate control. In Part III, this Article reviews the development of
the regulations from the perspective of the relationship between the
firm's employees and the DIP management. In Part IV, this Article
examines the current state of Chapter 11 reorganizations. Emphasis is
placed on the rise of secured creditors and DIP financiers, who in re-
cent years have managed to exert increasing control. Although the
10. See infra Part III(B)(6).
11. See infra Part III(B)(6). See also DELANEY, supra note 4, at 82-125.
12. See BARRY M. MITNICK, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION: CREATING, DESIGN-
ING, AND REMOVING REGULATORY FORMS (1980) (regarding the development of regulations);
ROBERT BALDWIN & MARTIN CAVE, UNDERSTANDING REGULATION: THEORY, STRATEGY, AND
PRACTICE 32 (1999). As Baldwin suggests: "[I]t would be optimistic, even rash, to suggest that
such [regulatory] theories can be synthesized so that reliable predictions can be made about all
or most regulatory processes. Different theories exist at differing levels of generality and have
varying applications and uses as explanatory tools." Id. at 32.
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2009 employee-driven Chapter 11 restructurings of Chrysler and Gen-
eral Motors must be seen as exceptional cases, the historical, political,
and economic conditions which allowed these reorganizations to take
place still persist and may point in some important respects to the
future of employees and Chapter 11 more generally. Part V discusses
this future.
II. THE DETERMINANTS OF CHAPTER 11's DEVELOPMENT
Before embarking upon a detailed review of the legal regime and its
development since 1978, it is helpful to set the scene and identify the
regulations' sources of influence. Together, these sources of influence
establish the backdrop for understanding the basic logic and limits of
the formal rules of Chapter 11, their subsequent interpretation by the
courts, and the potential for employee participation in the Chapter 11
bargaining process. This setting accordingly places the discussion re-
garding employment rights within the larger issue of the firm's con-
trolling rights during a Chapter 11 procedure. Only if we set the
relevant legal developments within this larger setting of Chapter 11
can we make any valid assumptions regarding the future.
A. Chapter 11 as a Value Maximization Creditor
Enforcement Mechanism
According to the dominant scholars' view, Chapter 11 and, more
generally, the Bankruptcy Code should exclusively establish a compul-
sory collectivist arrangement that will maximize returns to creditors
(the Creditor Wealth Maximization Model).' 3 This view of the logic
and limits of the law is underpinned by an ideological vision regarding
the role and limits of corporate law more generally. Thus, since the
role of the law outside the bankruptcy realm is to maximize share
value, within the bankruptcy realm, the role of the law remains incen-
tivizing the maximization of value. The difference being that in bank-
ruptcy, while shareholders are ousted from control, control shifts to
the company creditors, providing the firm's residual claimants with
the strongest incentive to maximize proceeds. 14
Thus, bankruptcy procedures should come into play only when mul-
tiple withdrawal rights are triggered and when the exercise of these
rights by individual investors is costly and interferes with the deploy-
13. THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITs OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 53, 212 (1986).
14. Katherine H. Daigle & Michael T. Maloney, Residual Claims in Bankruptcy: An Agency
Theory Explanation, 37 J.L. & EcoN. 157 (1994).
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ment of the firm's assets.15 Such procedures will reduce strategic
costs, enable administrative efficiency, and increase the value of the
aggregate pool of assets by providing the possibility of liquidation,
ongoing business activity, or corporate restructuring. An underlying
assumption of this economic analysis of the law is that the compulsory
procedure saves the multiplicity of collection costs if creditors were
not obligated to act as a collective. Thus, the law fulfills a secondary
role by reducing the risks associated with default to creditors, while
minimizing credit costs so as to contribute to overall growth.16
Under economic analysis, no reference should be made to distribu-
tive concerns in bankruptcy. Thus, effect should be given only to ex-
isting pre-insolvency rights, and new rights should not be created.' 7
Importantly, the protection of employment is an issue of labor law
outside the realm of bankruptcy regulations. As Baird put it: "Every
investor in a firm bargains explicitly at the time he contributes assets
to the firm for the power to extract his assets from the firm if events
do not work out as planned."' 8 The establishment of new entitle-
ments in the bankruptcy realm conflicts with the collectivization goal
and serves as an incentive for a particular holder of rights to resort to
bankruptcy to gain the advantages the scheme provides even when a
bankruptcy proceeding is not in the collective interest of the invest-
ment group. It follows that keeping the firm in operation to protect
non-creditors and other victims of corporate bankruptcy, such as em-
ployees, is not the role of the law.19 Instead, the central objective of
the law is to maximize returns from assets, whether by reorganization
or liquidation, without any moral value attached to either of these op-
tions; it is strictly a matter of reaching the best value that can be ob-
tained on a dollar-equivalent basis.20 Thus, this approach accepts the
15. Referred to as the "common pool problem." See Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-
Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 864 (1982).
16. See generally William H. Meckling, Financial Markets, Default, and Bankruptcy: The Role
of the State, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 13 (1977); Fred J. Weston, Some Economic Fundamen-
tals for an Analysis of Bankruptcy, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 47 (1977).
17. VANESSA FINCH, CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAw: PERSPECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES 28 (2d
ed., 2009); Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL
STUD. 127, 131 (1986).
18. Baird, supra note 17, at 131.
19. JACKSON, supra note 13, at 25.
20. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV.
751, 758 (2003) ("[Wie have a going-concern surplus (the thing the law of corporate reorganiza-
tions exists to preserve) only to the extent that there are assets that are worth more if located
within an existing firm. If all the assets can be used as well elsewhere, the firm has no value as a
going concern."); see also Charles W. Adams, An Economic Justification for Corporate Reorga-
nizations, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 117, 133 (1991) ("[M]ost assets are probably not highly firm-
specific, and so, most insolvent corporations will not have substantially greater going concern
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assumption that in some cases, maximizing the value of the firm's as-
sets must involve corporate restructuring and an opportunity to with-
hold claims, but this is connected to the need to maximize returns
rather than safeguard employment. 21 Accordingly, the goal of value
maximization and the need to refrain from creating special legal rules
within the bankruptcy realm undermine and contradict the establish-
ment of special employee protections under Chapter 11.
With this background in mind, it is clear why the detailed rules of
Chapter 11 provide creditors with strong controlling rights. Chapter
11 establishes a liquidation floor as the standard for approving a reor-
ganization scheme22 and includes provisions such as the "cram down"
provision23 and the absolute priority rule.24 Although the courts may
have initially dealt with these provisions rather flexibly,25 Congress
designed the rules to assure that restructuring will take place only if it
is likely to generate more income for creditors than liquidation.26
Chapter 11 also established the doctrine of adequate protection, 27
which the courts have interpreted as requiring a debtor to provide
"the most indubitable equivalence [to one's security interest]." 28 This
doctrine was designed to guarantee that a restructuring plan would
not disadvantage secured creditors. While courts did not compensate
than liquidation values and, consequently, will not be good candidates for an effective
reorganization.").
21. See H.R. REP. No. 595, at 220 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6179 ("[T]he
premise of a business reorganization is that assets that are used for production in the industry for
which they were designed are more valuable than those same assets sold for scrap."); see also
Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043
(1991).
22. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii), 92 Stat.
2549, 2636 (1978) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii) (2006)) (stating that each creditor
will receive at least as much as he will receive if the debtor was liquidated under Chapter 7).
However, § 1129(a)(7)(A)(i) allows the court to confirm a plan if each member of the impaired
class accepts it.
23. Id. § 1129(b) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1)).
24. Id. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii)) (indicating that under
the absolute priority rule, no class of creditors will receive any value under a restructuring plan
without the consent of the superior class of creditors according to the majority required in each
class or if it is paid in full.).
25. Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of Priority of
Claims, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 285 (1990). This is no longer the case. See Lawrence A. Weiss &
Vedran Capkun, Bankruptcy Resolution: Priority of Claims with the Secured Creditor in Control
(Am. Law & Econ. Ass'n Annual Meeting, The Berkley Electronic Press, Working Paper, 2007).
26. Jack Friedman, What Courts Do to Secured Creditors in Chapter II Cram Down, 14 CAR-
Dozo L. REV. 1495 (1993).
27. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, § 361 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 361 (2006)) (indicating that
adequate protection has to be proven in order to justify the continuation of the automatic stay).
28. Metropolitan Life Ins. Corp. v. Murel Holding Corp. (In re Murel Holding Co.), 75 F.2d
941, 942 (2d Cir. 1935) (Learned Hand, J.).
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creditors for the time spent under Chapter 11,29 the doctrine indicates
a commitment towards the protection of credit. As this Article will
show further below,30 these legal mechanisms have paved the way to
the increased ability of capital providers to dominate the procedure.
Together with other legal rules and judicial doctrines, it is understood
that a relation of dependency has been created between secured credi-
tors and the DIP. This allows secured creditors to share control with
the DIP and ultimately to dictate Chapter 11's business outcomes.
B. Chapter 11 as a Mechanism for the Protection of Stakeholders
In direct reaction to the abovementioned view of the law, the stake-
holder view of bankruptcy regulations focuses on the importance of
the multiplicity of parties and stakes that are at risk once the firm
fails.31 Well connected to the more general ideological view of the
role of corporate law outside the bankruptcy domain,32 proponents of
this view argue that Creditors' Wealth Maximization fails to recognize
the legitimate interest of many who are not defined as contract credi-
tors, devalues business relationships that have not been formulated
into contracts, fails to recognize other forms of contribution to the
company, and neglects non-economic values of a moral, political, so-
cial, and personal kind.33 Thus, instead of emphasizing private con-
tractual rights and fixed claims, bankruptcy law should weigh the
interests of the broad range of stakeholders affected by corporate dis-
tress. Professor Warren, the leading proponent of this approach, sees
bankruptcy law with its "inadequate pie to divide and the looming
discharge of unpaid debts" 34 as an attempt to reckon with a debtor's
multiple defaults and to distribute the consequences among a number
of different actors. 35 Thus, the redistribution of entitlements is, and
ought to be, promoted so that on bankruptcy high priority claimants
and the absolute priority rule will give way to other interest holders,
including the community at large, in sharing the value of the bankrupt
firm. This approach gives high value to distributional concerns:
29. United Say. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365 (1988).
30. See infra Part IV.
31. Roy M. GOODE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW 36-47 (2d ed. 1997).
32. See Merrick E. Dodd, For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees? 45 HARV. L. REV.
1145 (1932) (articulating the basis for the stakeholder theory of the corporation); see also R.
EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH (1984).
33. Karen Gross, Taking Community Interests into Account in Bankruptcy: An Essay, 72
WASH. U. L.Q. 1031, 1031 (1994); Donald R. Korobkin, Rehabilitation Values: A Jurisprudence
of Bankruptcy, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 717 (1991); see also FINCH, supra note 17, at 40-43.
34. Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 775, 785 (1987).
35. Id. at 789-93.
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"bankruptcy is simply a federal scheme designed to distribute the
costs among those at risk." 36 Regarding employees, Warren stated
that Chapter 11 has the important objective of maximizing the wealth
of the debtor's estate, but also of serving the distributional interests of
many who are not "technically" creditors but have an interest in a
business' continued existence. This includes, for example, older em-
ployees who could not have retrained for another job:
By giving the debtor business an opportunity to reorganize, the
bankruptcy scheme acknowledges the losses of those who have de-
pended on the business and redistributes some of the risk of loss
from the default. Even if dissolution is inevitable, the bankruptcy
process allows for delay, which in turn gives time for all those rely-
ing on a business to accommodate the coming change. 37
In practice, the vision of the law as a mechanism for stakeholder
protection is echoed within the direct and indirect legal mechanisms
which together shape the Chapter 11 bargaining environment. For ex-
ample, Congress provided many reasons, including the public interest
and the protection of stakeholders, for the enactment of the 1978
Bankruptcy Code, the repeal of the New Deal Chandler Act,38 and
the re-introduction of an insider-the DIP-as facilitators of in-
creased corporate restructuring. 39 The underlying assumption was
that because of the management opportunity to retain control, more
corporate reorganizations would take place. Similarly, the com-
mencement of the "automatic stay" immediately after a Chapter 11
application is submitted40 incentivizes the triggering of the bankruptcy
procedure at an early stage of financial decline. Effectively the com-
pany, which can still trade under the control of the pre-bankruptcy
management, becomes an anomalous legal creation with significant
powers, which can enforce rights but cannot be asked to fully respect
36. Id. at 790.
37. Id. at 787-88.
38. The Chandler Act directed large-scale corporate reorganizations into Chapter 10 of the
Code, imposing the appointment of a trustee, discharged the board and gave the SEC a strong
oversight role. Bankruptcy Act, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 883 (1938).
39. See 124 CONG. REc. 32,392 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards) (re-
garding the interest of the "investment public, jobs and troubled businesses"); 124 CONG. REC.
33,990 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1978) (per Sen. DeConcini). See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 53-62 (Sep. 8,
1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6014-23, for a discussion of the impact of bankruptcy on
the community Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. See H.R. Doc. No.93-197 (Sep. 6, 1973) (re-
garding the "overriding community goals and values" in bankruptcy), for a discussion of the
Bankruptcy Laws of the United States.
40. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 363, 92 Stat. 2549, 2549 (1978)
(codified at 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2006)).
356 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAw JOURNAL [Vol. 10:347
its obligations. 41 The onus of lifting the stay of procedure, rather than
justifying it, is on the company creditors. An underlining assumption
is that the retention of control and the ease in which Chapter 11 can
be triggered and sustained would protect a variety of stakeholders
since it will increase the number of failing businesses undergoing reor-
ganizations at an early stage.
Following the legislation, and while referring to the terminology
Congress used when passing the Act, bankruptcy courts have taken
the Act to contain an implicit policy of facilitating corporate reorgani-
zations for the purpose of protecting the investing public and jobs, as
well as addressing concerns about the impact of bankruptcy upon the
community and the general public.42 In practice, this has meant that
for the purpose of facilitating corporate reorganizations, courts have
continuously widened this newfound managerial discretion. For ex-
ample, allowing companies to routinely extend the stay of proceedings
as well as the "exclusivity period" over and beyond the statutory six-
month limit confers bargaining power onto the DIP.4 3 Of course, the
length of the moratorium and its scope, combined with managerial
discretion, significantly circumvents the employees' ability-unionized
or not-to influence the outcome of the Chapter 11 negotiation pro-
cess. As an example, between 1980 and 2012, the average duration of
a large corporate non-pre-packaged Chapter 11 proceeding has been
nearly two years." During this time, employees are under pressure to
agree to the very minimum proposed since firms can easily dispose of
them. Courts further expand managerial discretion by allowing the
41. It has been suggested that Chapter 11 resembles an anti-takeover "poison pill" whereas
transition in control can only take place through the court. See Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra
note 21.
42. See NLRB v. Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984) ("[Tlhe fundamental purpose of reorgani-
zation is to prevent a debtor from going into liquidation, with an attendant loss of jobs and
possible misuse of economic resources."). The court went on and cited the views expressed by
congress-the purpose of facilitating restructures-as the basis for such an interpretation of the
law. Id.
43. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, § 1121 (b), (c)(3) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b), (c)(3))
(governing the exclusivity period, which currently grants the debtor a 120-day period to propose
a reorganization plan, and an additional sixty day period to have its plan accepted). Only after
the expiration of this 180-day period may creditors submit their own reorganization plan. Id.
See also Kordana & Posner, supra note 7 (using game theory to model Chapter 11 bargaining).
44. Lynn M. LoPucki developed a bankruptcy research database of all public corporations
undergoing bankruptcy reorganization in the USA. Bankruptcy Research Database, UCLA,
available at http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/ [hereinafter Bankruptcy Research Database] (last visited
Apr. 2, 2012). He regards large public corporations as such if the debtor's assets exceed $500
million. His database indicates that such restructurings took on average 697 days. Id. at http://
lopucki.law.ucla.edultables-and-graphs/Average%2OCase%20Duration%202001-2011.pdf.
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DIP to shut down and sell business units practically at will.4 5 Thus,
although Congress designed the plan approval stage to allocate partic-
ipation rights to creditor classes, through "pre-packs," workouts, and
ongoing Chapter 11 foreclosures, not much is left for the plan confir-
mation stage.46
This increase in managerial discretion furthers the U.S.-centralized
management model for corporate governance and control, but has
been legitimized under the notion of increased stakeholder protec-
tion.47 The assumption is that the increase in the number of corporate
reorganizations will result in a reduction of unnecessary liquidations.
However, from the perspective of the company employees, the stake-
holder view of the company has another important consequence: in
labor-management conflicts, this approach undermines the bilateral
context in which the labor-capital conflict has been regulated since
the New Deal, moving the conflict from a bilateral to a multilateral
context.48 In other words, outside the bankruptcy realm, Congress has
regulated collective bargaining through laws that focus on the power
relation between employees and management through collective bar-
gaining, advance notice, and protections against unfair dismissals. In-
troducing the stakeholder model into the adjudication of labor
disputes within the realm of bankruptcy undermines this bilateral con-
text. Indirectly, it reduces the power of the firm's employees, who
now face multilateral interests and various stakeholders whose inter-
ests may or may not converge with their own. This problem will be
further explored below after dealing with the issue of collective bar-
gaining under Chapter 11.
45. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, § 363(b) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)) (establish-
ing the terms under which it is possible to sell the property of the estate outside the ordinary
course of business. This section requires court authorization after notice and hearing.). Comm.
of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063, 1066 (2d Cir. 1983)
(establishing the "sound business reason" requirement for approving a sale). But see In re White
Motor Credit Corp., 14 B.R. 584, 590 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981) (requiring "Imminent Emer-
gency"). See infra Part III(B)(4).
46. See infra Part IV.
47. See supra note 39.
48. See Richard L. Merrick, The Bankruptcy Dynamics of Collective Bargaining Agreements,
91 COM. L.J. 169, 188 (1986) (noting the conflict between employee interests and the purpose of
the procedure. "[Tihe bankruptcy's court role is to balance the interests of all the adversaries
and produce a fair and equitable result. Modifications of a collective bargaining agreement have
bilateral significance, but that is relatively unimportant in the overall objective of bankruptcy.").
According to Stakeholder theory, the strategy of building alliances enables the company to
counter antagonistic stakeholders and to escape a bilateral relationship in favour of a multilat-
eral one. EDWARD R. FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH 135
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2010).
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C. Chapter 11 and the Issue of Forum Shopping
The third determinant that needs to be addressed to understand the
forces influencing Chapter 11's evolution is the tension that underpins
the regulations and which stems from the existence of two separate
political frameworks. While bankruptcy is federal law, when a la-
bor-management conflict is at the core of the procedure, state law has
been developed through judicial law making to expand managerial
discretion and, subsequently, states have attracted the business of the
big bankruptcy cases.
This phenomenon occurs because the bankruptcy venue provisions
are quite flexible, permitting a troubled firm to file for bankruptcy in
any district where it has its principal place of business, principal asset
or domicile, or where an affiliated company filed for bankruptcy.49
Effectively, this permits large public corporations, which have busi-
ness all over the county, to file for bankruptcy anywhere they wish.
Throughout the 1980s companies would routinely file their bank-
ruptcy applications in New York, close to the big law firms and away
from the production lines. By the early 1990s this had changed, and
Delaware became the venue of choice for most large public corporate
reorganizations.50 Today Delaware is still the leading venue, with
New York still a significant forum, and the rest of the U.S. bankruptcy
courts trailing far behind.5'
Professor LoPucki argues that the problem begins with judicial self-
interest. According to LoPucki, the status that the power relating to
managing the big cases confers goes beyond the courtroom to encom-
pass finance, professional, and media circles. Managing the large
cases provides bankruptcy judges with a high profile and status. Fur-
thermore, as part of the local legal community, attracting big cases,
LoPucki argues, is a form of debt payment to the community in which
the judge adjudicates. As one judge noted anonymously:
It's an economic thing. A lot of money flows to Delaware because
of these cases. It supports a cottage industry of local counsel. The
money goes to everything from cabs, to the train station, to hotels.
49. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353,
§ 102(a), 98 Stat. 333, 334 (1984) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1408 (2006)).
50. See generally Robert K. Rasmussen & Randall S. Thomas, Timing Matters: Promoting
Forum Shopping by Insolvent Corporations, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1357 (2000) (attributing the rise
of Delaware to the filing of the Eastern Airline Bankruptcy in March 1989). See also LYNN M.
LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: How COMPETITION FOR THE BIG CASES IS CORRUPTING THE
BANKRUPTCY COURTS 49, 68 (Univ. Mich. Press 2005) (noting that in 1996, eighty-seven percent
of all big cases were filed in Delaware, and from 1991-96, forty-one new big cases filing were
made in Delaware compared with New York's fifteen).
51. LoPUCKI, supra note 50, at 245.
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You can't get a hotel room there some nights, and who goes to Del-
aware? It's very important to them. You've got to look at all sides.
As a visiting judge, you have to be sensitive to the local culture. 52
The rise of Delaware to prominence as the venue of choice for large
corporate reorganizations has been controversial. Generally, some
believe that while forum shopping is undisputed, it reflects the exper-
tise and efficiency that the court of choice acquires through ongoing
handling of bankruptcy procedures.53 Furthermore, it is also believed
that the stakes related to maintaining Delaware's position as the
venue of choice incentivizes the preservation of their ongoing exper-
tise, which has led to the "success" of the Delaware (and New York)
bankruptcy courts in managing large corporate restructurings. 54 The
repetitive role of the courts gives predictability to the procedure and
attracts further big cases. During the 1990s, LoPucki and Kalin pro-
vided empirical support to undermine the merits of the "Delawariza-
tion" of Chapter 11 reorganizations. They found that Delaware-
restructured corporations are likely to require a second bankruptcy
filing.55 Nonetheless, this was justified as an efficient "weeding out"
process of the marginal and more difficult cases, which have the op-
portunity to realize that they do need a complex, lengthy, and expen-
sive Chapter 11 restructuring after filing and implementing pre-
packs. 56 But those who explain and justify such phenomena, and
those who criticize it, suggest that Delaware judges do not (or cannot)
properly scrutinize the reorganization plans they confirm.57
On the other hand, there are several objections to the rise of New
York and Delaware as the venues of choice. First, the advantage of
Delaware for the debtor is its inconvenient geographical location for
small, local creditors that incorporated elsewhere; they find it difficult
to challenge and participate in the procedure in Delaware. Most cor-
porate debtors can file in Delaware because they or one of their affili-
ated companies incorporated in Delaware, and not because they have
52. Id. at 95.
53. David A. Skeel, Jr., What's So Bad About Delaware?, 54 VAND. L. REV. 309, 319 (2001);
Rasmussen & Thomas, supra note 50, at 1385.
54. DAVID A. SKEEL, DEBT'S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUFTCY LAW IN AMERICA 132,
230 (2004); see also Harvey R. Miller, Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases and the Delaware Myth,
55 VAND. L. REV. 1987, 1991-94 (2002).
55. See Lynn M. LoPucki & Sara D. Kalin, The Failure of Public Company Bankruptcies in
Delaware and New York: Empirical Evidence of a "Race to the Bottom", 54 VAND L. REV. 231
(2001); see also Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Why are Delaware and New York
Bankruptcy Reorganizations Failing?, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1933 (2002).
56. Robert K. Rasmussen & Randal S. Thomas, Whither the Race? A Comment on the Effects
of the Delawarization of Corporate Reorganizations, 54 VAND. L. REV. 283, 288-89 (2001).
57. Id. See also LoPUCKI, supra note 50, at 240-43.
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their actual production or ongoing businesses there. What is true for
small, unsecured creditors is also true with respect to the company
employees, who are not residents of Delaware. Even though they can
hire a local representative, the court is far away from the avenues of
influence and pressure that come with a lengthy bankruptcy proce-
dure, ongoing downsizing, and the related social unrest. The second,
closely related reason is that the rise of the Delaware bankruptcy
court is due to its ability to develop a cozy relationship with the bank-
ruptcy bar, the case setters, who bring the cases to Delaware. Thus,
the lawyers representing the debtor are granted high (some may say
excessive) fees, which incentivize them to come again.58
Accordingly, the procedural leniency that bankruptcy courts estab-
lished has been attractive to the DIP, allowing it to effectively retain
control over the procedure and its outcomes. For example, waiver of
interest rates on loans once a Chapter 11 procedure is triggered is
treated differently in Boston than in Delaware (allowed in the latter).
Exclusivity periods are extended routinely in Delaware and New
York, up to three years on average,59 usually ending only when the
creditors agree to a plan. Before plan conformation, New York and
Delaware courts generously and routinely grant Section 363 sales of
material company assets, divisions, and sometimes the whole of the
business or the company during this time. "Critical Vendor" orders,
for example, allowing post-bankruptcy payments to particular non-se-
cured creditors, are allowed in Delaware and in other courts that com-
pete for the big cases, whereas in other, non-participating courts, it is
not.60 Delaware and New York routinely approve exemption from li-
ability for the company's directors. In both jurisdictions, it is certain
that a trustee to the company would not be appointed even in the
most controversial cases, such as WorldCom and Enron, both adminis-
tered in New York. And lastly, Delaware and New York always ap-
prove pre-packaged bankruptcies, leading LoPucki to call these courts
58. Cf LoPUCKI, supra note 50, at 128 (noting that in 2000 Delaware got forty-five of the
seventy-nine cases filed nationally (fifty-seven percent) and awarded in these cases over $700
million in professional fees and expenses). LoPucki discusses the waver of fee caps and the
routine approval rate of lawyer fee applications. Id. at 141-43.
59. See Bankruptcy Research Database, supra note 44.
60. See In re Krnart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 868 (7th Cir. 2004) (indicating an order to allocate
$300 million to critical vendors was described by the Chicago Bankruptcy Court as an "open-
ended permission to pay any debt to any vendor [Kmart] deemed 'critical' in the exercise of
unilateral discretion."); see also LOPUCKI, supra note 50, at 132-35 (describing the Chicago Sev-
enth Circuit decision to disallow such an order, together with the disapproval of exclusion of
liability to the company directors, as the cause for the demise of Chicago as a venue of choice).
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no more than "rubber stamp[s] for pre-packs." 6 1 All these, of course,
confer significant bargaining power to the debtor vis-a-vis all its credi-
tors, including its employees, inducing debtor-firms to choose these
particular jurisdictions again.
Against the background of these separate avenues of influence, the
law-both the basic mechanisms of Chapter 11 as well as ex post judi-
cial law making-has shaped the trajectory in which Chapter 11 has
developed. An ideological view regarding wealth maximization has
embraced the economic benefits of allowing firms a second chance
while vesting power with firm managers and creditors. This was com-
bined and supported by a notion regarding stakeholder protection,
also supportive of allowing failing firms a chance to reorganize their
affairs while eliminating employee objections to corporate reorganiza-
tions. These dominant visions of bankruptcy law, combined with the
institutional framework in which bankruptcy courts operate while
competing over the big cases, influenced the development of the law,
while continuously undermining employee protection.
III. THE PAST: CHAPTER 11, STRATEGIC BANKRUPTCIES, AND THE
RESTRUCTURING OF THE LABOR FORCE
A. Employees and the Making of Chapter 11
Historically, nothing in the function of bankruptcy law required that
the treatment of employees would be through a designated and sepa-
rate procedure. 62 In 1938, Congress introduced the Chandler Act,63
establishing a new legal regime for the restructuring of large public
corporations. Congress designed the Chandler Act with the objective
of loosening the control of investment bankers (the issuers of corpo-
rate bonds) and insiders (the managerial elites, majority shareholders,
and lawyers) over bankruptcy reorganizations, prevalent during the
restructuring of the railroads. 64 In large corporate reorganizations,
through Chapter 10 of the Code, the Chandler Act introduced the
SEC (itself established in 1934)65 and the courts as the government's
safeguards for the investment public interest (minority shareholders,
61. LOPUCKI, supra note 50, at 74 (noting that seventy-seven percent of cases in Delaware
were "pre-packs.").
62. The notion that employee rights should be no different in the out-of-bankruptcy context
fits into the creditors' wealth maximization model, according to which bankruptcy must exclu-
sively respect pre-insolvency rights. See supra Part II(A).
63. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 101, 92 Stat. 2549, 2549 (1978)
(codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101 (2006)).
64. SKEEL, supra note 54, at 125.
65. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 4(a), 48 Stat. 881, 885 (1934)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2006)).
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but mostly debenture holders). It required strict adherence to the ab-
solute priority rule, meaning that no class of creditors could retain any
value under a restructuring plan if an upper class of creditors was not
paid in full. By adhering to absolute priority, the Act targeted the
ability of insiders to control bankruptcy procedures through equity re-
ceivership and other contractual arrangements. Through this control,
bankers reorganized failing firms while re-issuing bonds to finance
them anew and while allowing the previous management and particu-
lar connected shareholders to retain control. Accordingly, Congress
designed the Chandler Act to break the alliance between bankers and
managerial elites, and to protect the investing public.
Simultaneously, Congress dealt with and transformed collective la-
bor legislation during the New Deal by introducing the Wagner Act 66
and other related institutions designed to enable collective bargaining
and to advance a new compromise between labor and capital. This
separation between the world of bankruptcy and that of labor legisla-
tion was maintained throughout the introduction of Chapter 11 in
1978. The subtle assumption-that bankruptcy is not the arena for
labor legislation-was maintained throughout the legislation period
and the "meta bargaining" that preceded it.67 This separation ex-
plains, accordingly, the almost complete non-involvement of labor
representatives during the legislative process of Chapter 11.68
Ultimately, this lack of explicit labor related ideology in the forma-
tion stage of the legislation explains the fact that Chapter 11 was
adopted through non-partisan voting with supporting majorities on
both sides of the political realm: "the substance of bankruptcy law was
not terribly political in terms of party ideology."69 A story relating to
the signature of President Carter on the Bill in 1978 reveals the extent
of the "non politicization" of Chapter 11's enactment process:
[A]ccording to sources, perhaps apocryphal, the President called his
long time colleague, Attorney-General Griffin Bell, from Camp
David for advice minutes before midnight on the final day the bill
could be signed into law. The President asked Bell what he should
66. National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 1, 49 Stat. 449, 449 (1935) (codified at
29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006)).
67. See BRUCE G. CARRUTHERS & TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, RESCUING BUSINESS: THE MAK-
ING OF CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES 15 (Clarendon Press
1998) (defining "meta bargaining" as negotiations over the system of property rights rather than
property exchange).
68. See id. at 81, 83, 84, 87-88, 94-95, 97, 99-100 (mentioning the National Bankruptcy Con-
ference and the National Conference of Bankruptcy Referees (both from within the legal profes-
sion), the Commercial Law League (composed of bankruptcy lawyers), the Judicial Conference
of the United States and the finance industry).
69. Id. at 90.
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do. Bell replied that so many people had worked so hard on it, the
President should go ahead 'and sign the damn thing.' And so he
did.70
The absence of labor organizations from the debate preceding the
legislation, accordingly, is connected to the overall absence of explicit
ideologies during Chapter 11's enactment stage. As Carruthers and
Halliday put it, Chapter 11 "carries the mark of weakened unions and
assertive company managers."71 The trade unions' limited contribu-
tion to the reform focused on benefits to workers in bankruptcy, while
participation rights were not pursued. 72 Carruthers and Halliday sug-
gest that "labor may have been distracted, for it was heavily involved
with bills such as the Employee Retirement Income Security Act,
which passed in 1974 with the strong support of organized labor, and
the Labor Law Reform Act, which unions tried to get passed in the
late 1970s ... ."73 Consequently, employees' interest in the bankruptcy
scheme was limited to safeguarding the existing position of employees
as preferred creditors in a distribution scenario, rather than pursuing
avenues of obtaining a voice during corporate reorganizations. This
priority status was established before the reforms were put in place
and were only maintained under the reform. According to their prior-
ity status, employees were paid ahead of unsecured creditors while the
amount was capped at a limited sum. When Congress revisited the
law, lobbying was trapped in a conceptual framework dictated by their
prior bankruptcy experience and the traditional rules regarding em-
ployee protections (improving their priority, increasing the maximum
sum to which their priority applied, and extending priority to em-
ployee benefits). While channelling their focus and demands towards
these areas, trade unions completely failed to understand and antici-
pate the consequences of the 1978 reform and neglected the opportu-
nity to lobby for protection thorough the terms dealing with executory
contracts and collective agreements or plan approval. Indeed, "[the]
workers' well entrenched position in prior bankruptcy statutes proved
something of a liability, especially in the United States, for it locked
organized labor into a conceptual frame that blinded it to dangers that
70. Id. at 86.
71. Id. at 9.
72. CARRUTHERS & HALLIDAY, supra note 67, at 328-30 (indicating that the Chief legal coun-
cil of the Garment Workers Union, Max Zimny, led the charge on behalf of the American Feder-
ation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations). In an interview, Zimny referred
to his efforts as "singular." Id. at 329.
73. CARRUTHERS & HALLIDAY, supra note 67, at 328-29.
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only became fully apparent after the Bankruptcy Code had been
enacted." 74
Importantly, instead of attracting politicians and union lobbyists,
the pre-Chapter 11 legislation process attracted legal professionals.
Thus, in front of the Congress judiciary committee to which the bill
was submitted, bankruptcy practitioners and judges were the domi-
nant active participants.75 These participants rendered a professional
non-partisan dimension to this process.76 At the same time, the desire
to uphold and in some ways increase the influence of the legal profes-
sion over large corporate reorganizations was highly relevant to the
debate as well as to the procedure that was ultimately adopted: a
court-driven procedure steered by lawyers, in which significant legal
fees could be extracted and where the judiciary is of central impor-
tance. Instead of having an interest in the outcomes that would follow
in a distributive, public policy perspective, these constituencies were
consumed with the will to preserve (or enhance) their role within the
procedure. Internal conflict regarding the elevation of bankruptcy
judges to a status similar to that of federal court judges and the follow-
ing subjection of large corporate reorganizations to their jurisdiction
consumed the judiciary.77 At the same time, this professional "coloni-
zation" of the debate eliminated the charged political struggle that the
legislative process ought to have been, particularly given the decision
to largely oust government supervision from large company restruc-
turings and to reinstate the DIP. Ultimately, the decision to establish
a court driven procedure, steered by lawyers, has been detrimental to
the development of Chapter 11, not least because of the federal set-
ting in which bankruptcy courts operate.
B. Shaping Chapter l's Bargaining Environment
Formally, the courts were careful to reduce their role in any particu-
lar Chapter 11 proceeding to the orderly compliance of participants to
its administrative guidelines.78 Nonetheless, in practice, socio-political
74. Id. at 308.
75. SKEEL, supra note 54, at 175. Skeel discusses the fact that the SEC was absent from these
debates. See also CARRUTHERS & HALLIDAY, supra note 67, at 63-157 (providing a detailed
review of the role of the legal profession and the financial industry in shaping Chapter 11).
76. See ANDREw ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE DIVISION OF
EXPERT LABOR (Univ. of Chi. Press 1988).
77. CARRUTHERS & HALLIDAY, supra note 67, at 84-86.
78. As Hon. Ronald Barliant of the Chicago Bankruptcy Court commented, "The subject of a
chapter 11 plan is financial: the debtor's capital structure. Nothing in chapter 11 dictates the
result in a particular case; you cannot look in a law book to find the optimal debt-to-equity ratio
for a debtor. Chapter 11 creates a framework that allocates leverage and requires the gathering
2012] THE TRAJECTORY OF LABOR RELATIONS UNDER CHAPTER 11 365
choices were made in which the boundaries of control were rede-
signed. Examining the issue of employee protection from the view-
point of controlling rights shows that there are three principal
domains in which this is evident. First, in managing the restructuring
of the business, courts have expanded managerial discretion by con-
tinuously moving the limits established under the procedural rules of
the Code, effectively increasing the leverage that the DIP possesses
throughout the restructuring negotiations. In practice, this has meant
extending the time allowed to stay under bankruptcy protection, ex-
panding the scope of the stay of proceedings, and favoring the debtor
in disputes related to the management of the company, thus allowing
the debtor to sell the entire business or at least parts of it during the
procedure before a restructuring plan is approved. All these measures
safeguard the debtor's discretion, effectively allowing the procedure
to end successfully. In doing so, the courts have increased the tempta-
tion for the debtor to resort to bankruptcy for strategic reasons, and
for these reasons alone.79 Second, in relation to employees, beyond
the implicit assumption that increased reorganizations will provide
better protection of employment, courts did not provide them with
participation rights that would reflect their interest in the firm beyond
their contractual entitlements.80 Thus, their ability to control or influ-
ence the content of the reorganization plan was blocked because they
were excluded from the plan confirmation stage and creditors' com-
mittees. Third, courts created a new collective bargaining regime
within the realm of Chapter 11. Under this regime, while emphasizing
the collective nature of the process, courts effectively reduced collec-
tive rights as compared with the out-of-bankruptcy regime.8'
1. DIP Control, Absolute Priority, and New Value
The primary balancing mechanism against the DIP's ability to con-
trol Chapter 11's business outcome was the requirement that any reor-
ganization plan be approved in creditors' meetings by a
predetermined majority and voted through classes of creditors with
similar interests. Accordingly, a majority of creditors in a class can
bind the other forty-nine percent, as long as the total dollar amount of
and exchange of information to produce a negotiated plan of reorganization." Hon. Ronald A.
Barliant, Advanced Chapter 11 Issues, AM. BANKR. INST. (2001).
79. See infra Part III(B)(1) & (4).
80. See infra Part III(B)(2) & (3). Compare Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in
Property, 40 STAN. L. REv. 611 (1988) (arguing for participation rights and the option to buy the
failing firm as the acknowledgment of an employee proprietary interest in the firm, created
through continuous work).
81. See infra Part III(B)(6).
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the claims held by the majority is at least two-thirds of the total
amount of all the claims that vote.82 This softened the harsh conse-
quences of strict adherence to the Absolute Priority Rule, which ex-
isted under the Chandler Act and imposed a blanket prohibition on
insiders (mainly shareholders and managers) from retaining any value
in the company post-restructuring without the consent of all superior
class of creditors (especially bond holders).83 Under Chapter 11, it is
presumed that the requirement for plan confirmation constitutes a
counter balancing mechanism against the debtor's control over the
content of a reorganization plan, while striking a balance against the
problems associated with strict absolute priority.84
The option to deviate from the absolute priority rule is enthusiasti-
cally taken advantage of. As some research shows, eighty percent of
confirmed plans in cases involving publicly held corporations allo-
cated some equity to old shareholders.85 The retention of control by
manager-shareholders is only a manifestation of the fact that a plan
developed and conceived by the DIP is ultimately subject to very min-
imal contention by other stakeholders, not least employees and un-
secured creditors. However, this excludes finance providers who are
able to leverage influence through an alternative mechanism, mainly
DIP financing mechanisms.86 Employees' ability to influence the pro-
cedure, on the other hand, is largely dictated by the need to retain
their services in the company, subject to the costs of dismissals as well
as the hiring and training new employees.
The ability to control the negotiations and to obtain the consent of
the creditor classes to the plan formulated by the DIP is made possi-
ble by several procedural rules, all established through continuous ju-
dicial rule setting. First, once entering the realm of Chapter 11, the
DIP enjoys an exclusivity period to formulate and propose a reorgani-
zation plan; while this occurs, the "automatic stay" shelters it.87 Effec-
tively, this shifts leverage to the DIP vis-d-vis all its creditors,
including the company employees, as only it can create a plan, which
will serve as the basis for negotiations. Initially Congress limited the
82. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 1126(c), 92 Stat. 2549, 2634 (1978)
(codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (2006)).
83. See SKEEL, supra note 54 at 124-25 regarding the rule's origins.
84. 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (spelling out Chapter 11's voting rules).
85. See Barliant, supra note 78 (quoting Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining
Over Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganisation of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139
U. PA. L. REV. 125 (1990)).
86. See supra Part IV.
87. The exclusivity period gives the debtor one hundred twenty days to file a plan and another
sixty days to solicit acceptance. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, § 1121 (codified at 11 U.S.C.
§ 1121).
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leverage of the DIP by putting a time constraint of four months on the
exclusivity period. Contrary to this initial intention, however, courts
allowed debtors to remain under bankruptcy protection for a consid-
erable time, usually throughout the procedure and even when an ini-
tial offer had failed to be accepted. The initial stay is rarely contested
since courts usually approve it. If, after the initial four months, a plan
is not agreed to, the court is reluctant to make an order, which effec-
tively renders the initial decision to permit Chapter 11 reorganization
wrong. In other words, once the initial automatic stay period has
failed to produce an agreement, the court has the perverse incentive
to extend the stay to justify the initial decision not to intervene, and to
help the DIP to reach a plan of reorganization. The incentive to carry
on with the push for an accepted reorganization plan is supported by
the flexible standards for acceptable plans contained in Chapter 11,
which, as mentioned above, offer the debtor's managers and owners
,an opportunity to obtain shares in the reorganized firm.88
Secondly, under Chapter 11, when only one class approves the plan,
it can still be approved if it does not "discriminate unfairly" and is
"fair and equitable."89 These rules were developed under Chandler
Act adjudication so as to avoid the harsh consequences of strict adher-
ence to the absolute priority rule, and Congress transposed the rules
into the 1978 Bankruptcy Code. As already discussed, unlike the
Chandler Act, Chapter 11 today actually deviates from the absolute
priority rule through a plan confirmation process that allocates value
to a inferior class despite some creditors' objection. Furthermore,
U.S. courts have created the doctrine of "cram down." 90 According to
this doctrine, if a senior class agrees to a plan and no junior class re-
ceives payments or money's worth under the plan, the cram down rule
allows the plan to be confirmed despite the objection of a lower class
of creditors. Effectively, this means that the most senior class that is
not paid in full (usually secured creditors) ends up owning the major-
ity of company shares since the only confirmable plan would be one
that gives the equity to that non-accepting creditor class. This further
strengthens the control of secured creditors over the plan formation
and approval process. Only if a superior class of creditors is con-
vinced that lower ranking creditors have something to contribute to
the value of the company will they agree that this class of creditors
88. Compare LoPucki, supra note 50, at 255 (noting that managers retain five to ten percent
equity on average). See Lynn LoPucki & William Whitford, Bargaining over Equity Share in the
Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 125 (1990).
89. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, § 1129(b)(1) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1)).
90. Id. § 1129(b) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)).
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retains some equity. Hence, the DIP works not only to protect its own
interests, but also to satisfy the secured creditor, which holds strategic
importance and increased influence over the DIP due to its position
under this rule. Through this rule, the approval stage becomes the
confirmation of a plan, which was effectively negotiated between the
debtor and his superior class of creditor over the heads of the rest of
the creditors.9 1
Furthermore, the absolute priority rule means that the classification
of claims according to their priority is the most important issue in de-
termining the nature of the reorganization plan that is produced.
Under these circumstances, the decision not to recognize the special
status of a particular creditor group within the priority of claims holds
implicit importance. Not recognizing that employee claims are differ-
ent than other claims in the priority scheme and adhering to the mar-
ket configuration reflects an important policy decision.
The harsh effects of the absolute priority rule can be tempered by
the court under the "New Value exception," which was created origi-
nally to ease the result of strict adherence to absolute priority under
the Chandler Act. 92 Under the New Value exception, the debtor's old
shareholders are permitted to retain an interest in the company even
though higher priority creditors are not paid in full, as long as the
shareholders contribute "money or money's worth" to the restructur-
ing effort.93
When focusing on New Value as potentially being "money's worth,"
the issue of labor contribution naturally comes up. In theory, recog-
nizing labor contribution as "New Value" would permit the allocation
of rights to employees under a restructuring plan in the absence of the
approval by a superior class of creditors. This, in turn, could allow
employees to bargain for value in the reorganized firm when continu-
ous operation and cooperation is required. When created, however,
the New Value exception did not expand to include the right of share-
holders or managers to retain their interest in the company through
continuous work. Thus, managers' promise to continue managing the
business in the future did not qualify as New Value because the value
was regarded as too "intangible." 94
91. The third limb during these negotiations is the DIP financier who holds "super priority
status" and through contractual mechanisms extract control. See infra Part IV.
92. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Boyd's Legacy and Blackstone Ghost,
1999 Sup. CT. REV. 393, 419-20 (1999).
93. Case v. L.A. Lumber Prods., 308 U.S. 106, 123 (1939).
94. Id.
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This must be understood against the backdrop of the pre-Chandler
Act era, when insiders were able to freely retain ownership through
equity receivership reorganizations, precisely the problem that the
Chandler Act was supposed to address. From this perspective,
through New Value, insiders could strike a deal with senior creditors
over the heads of junior creditors, hence circumventing the intended
purpose of the Chandler Act altogether.95 On the other hand, under
Chapter 11 the Absolute Priority rule allows a senior class of creditors
to block a plan unless it is paid in full or the plan is approved by the
rest of the class through the required majority voting. This veto
power creates a particular problem in cases when value under a plan
of reorganization (for example, through obtaining shares in the re-
structured entity) could be the only way to induce managers as well as
employees to remain in the company. In other words, the New Value
exception can be a way to avoid liquidation, inducing continuous con-
tribution by lower creditor classes, while allowing for flexibility in the
plan formation and approval process. Thus, bearing in mind the rigid-
ity of the Absolute Priority rule, not allowing labor contribution to be
regarded as "money's worth" impedes potential reorganization. On
the other hand, courts routinely permit old equity holders to retain
value in the restructured firm through what they regard as a "fair and
equitable" contribution of money to the company.96
The problem reached the Supreme Court in the case of Ahlers.97 A
small family-held company, which owned and managed a farm, exper-
ienced financial difficulties and asked to confirm a Chapter 11 plan
with its creditors. The senior of these creditors was a single lender
holding a mortgage agreement with security interest over the whole of
the farm. The secured creditor-as permitted under the absolute pri-
ority rule-was not willing to approve any restructuring plan if it left
the owner-managers of the company in possession of the farm. On
the other hand, the Ahlers, the owners of the farm, had to continu-
ously work on the farm to preserve the value of its stock and crops so
that they could pay off the mortgage and retain the chance that they
would be able to pay their creditors in full if their fortunes changed.
The Ahlers appealed to the bankruptcy court to acknowledge their
continuous contribution to the farm as New Value and to approve a
95. See SKEEL, supra note 54, at 234.
96. See In re Union Fin. Servs. Grp., 303 B.R. 390 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2003).
97. Nw. Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988); see also John D. Ayer, Rethinking
Absolute Priority After Ahlers, 87 MICH. L. REV. 963, 964-65 (1989).
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payment schedule, which would leave them in possession of the
farm.98
The U.S. Supreme Court, when considering the Ahlers' continuous
work as New Value, was not willing to extend the exception so that it
would include work. Rather, it regarded rights created through work
(aside from wages, of course) as "non fixed claims" and thus as not
qualified as "money or money's worth." Accordingly, because of ab-
solute priority, as far as it relates to an equitable non-fixed claim, em-
ployees must be subordinated to all other creditors, including
shareholders. Only after all other debtors are satisfied in full or agree
to the plan may the firm employees leave the process with equity in
hand.
The particular problem that Ahlers creates is recurrent in small and
medium enterprises, where only through ongoing operation can a bus-
iness survive and have any value at all. With the hope of managing
through troubled times and even saving the business, owners carry on
trading and investing time and money in their company beyond their
wage claims. Typically, this is a family-owned or small business scena-
rio, such as in Ahlers, where the managers were both the employees
and the owners of the family farm. Making them work to sustain the
business, and at the same time leaving them subject to the security
holder's discretion as to whether to allow them to retain any interest
in the business under the reorganization plan, raises many difficulties.
However, the subjection of labor contribution to the discretion of se-
cured and non-secured creditors' superiority extends beyond small
and medium firms. In large corporations, labor contribution in ex-
change for ownership rights in the reorganized firm may be the only
way to retain experienced employees and to preserve the value of the
business. The inability to give new equity in return for work with
court approval rather than through creditors' consent impedes the
rescuing of businesses and the creation of "employee-led"
reorganizations.
The meaning of Ahlers extends beyond the scope of the New Value
exception because the Court was not willing to attach any value to
workers' contribution to the company beyond that which was guaran-
teed under the contract of employment. Implicitly, by denying the
opportunity for employees to obtain control through continuous work,
reliance interest, or any other non-contractual claim for that matter,
was denied. 99
98. Id.
99. See Singer, supra note 80, at 701-33 (regarding employees reliance interest); see also
Marleen A. O'Connor, Restructuring the Corporation's Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing Fiduci-
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2. Voting and Confirming a Plan
In relation to voting on the reorganization plan, the courts allow the
debtor to strategically classify claims and use the claim classification
as a tool to obtain plan confirmation. The only instruction is that
"substantially similar" claims can but are not required to be placed in
the same class. Thus, as § 1123(a)(4) of the Code requires that all
claims within a class "are treated the same," the debtor can group
seemingly similar claims into different groups in order to permit dif-
ferent treatments under the plan or to attain plan confirmation by in-
cluding plan-opposing creditors with cooperative creditors to balance
the objections.100 In relation to employees, theoretically, and as in-
deed the case is in other jurisdictions, the plan confirmation stage
lends employees, as a class with a special and separate interest in the
plan, significant leverage.10' Since employees are expected to vote as
a group, they may hold effective veto over the plan confirmation, at
least vis-d-vis shareholders, subject to the absolute priority and cram
down rules. Similarly, if employees are given preference over other
unsecured creditors, their leverage would increase. In other words,
the voice of employees can change according to the treatment of their
claims either as separate or as elevated when compared to other
creditors.
Ultimately, the position of employees as a separate class rests on
the decision over whether or not the contract of employment is differ-
ent than other creditors' contracts. A non-traditional view of the em-
ployment contract may give weight to implicit obligations towards
employees,102 or a proprietary interest, created through continuous
work, to employees in the firm, 03 which may lead to giving employ-
ees, as a group, a special place within the scheme of plan confirmation.
ary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189, 1240-41 (1991) (providing a con-
tractual approach justifying employee rights during plant closure); Marleen A. O'Connor, The
Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to Facilitate Labor-Management Cooper-
ation, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 899, 905-14 (1993); Marleen A. O'Connor, Promoting Economic
Justice in Plant Closings: Exploring the Fiduciary/Contract Law Distinction to Enforce Implicit
Employment Agreements, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAw 219-45 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed.,
1995) (providing a contractual approach justifying employee rights during plant closure).
100. Finova Grp. Inc. v. BNP Paribas (In re Finova Grp. Inc.), 304 B.R. 630, 633-34 (D. Del.
2004) (establishing that within a class "equal treatment" is required, not "equal payment.").
There has to be "reasonable basis," however, for treating similar claims differently. In re Hof-
finger Indus. Inc., 321 B.R. 498 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2005).
101. See, Canadian Companies Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (Can.) (al-
lowing employees to form a separate class, but not necessarily: it is down to the court to decide
on a case by case basis.). See JANIS PEARL SARRA, CREDITORS RIGHTS AND THE PUBLIC INTER-
EST: RESTRUCTURING INSOLVENT CORPORATIONS 132 (2003).
102. See O'Connor, supra note 99.
103. See Singer, supra note 80.
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By contrast, it can be argued that only past wages and related debts
are to be taken into account and employees are nothing more than
regular unsecured creditors. The former proposition, that the employ-
ment contract is a different type of contract, may lead to an even
stronger claim, namely, that the employment agreement, with its de-
ferred wage structure and other non-wage related rights, holds prior-
ity over other regular contractual claims. Again, the strength of this
argument is evident when considered in the Chapter 11 context: the
Absolute Priority rule conditions any plan on the approval of superior
voting classes and allows the parties to cram down a plan despite dis-
approval by subordinated classes if all superior classes approve the
plan. However, under Chapter 11, employees are placed as a non-
secured regular fixed claim creditor and thus do not have any priority
status over other fixed claim creditors. This is not surprising once the
claim classification process is placed within the larger view of the cor-
poration as a nexus of contracts. Furthermore, not only do employees
lack any priority over other fixed claim interest holders, but they also
do not vote as a separate group, but rather together with other un-
secured creditors.104
However, some portion of employees' claims, namely the portion
that enjoys preferred status in distribution, cannot possibly be seen as
regular unsecured debt, and thus, potentially permit veto through vot-
ing, subject to its subordination to higher priority claims. 05 Section
507(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code provides employees with a priority
status (which is fourth in the order of priority) against their back
wages to a limit of $11,725 earned, while § 507(a)(5) provides priority
status (fifth in its overall priority) to another $10,000 owed to the em-
ployee benefit plan in relation to the 180 days which preceded the
filing of the bankruptcy petition.106 These priority claims can be
104. Cf Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25, 28 (1952) ("[T]he board argues that the interest of
the United States in eradicating unfair labor practices is so great that the back pay order should
be given the additional sanction of priority in payment. Whether that should be done is a legisla-
tive decision.").
105. See David Milman, Priority Rights on Corporate Insolvency, in CURRENT ISSUES IN IN-
SOLVENcy LAw 57 (Alison Clarke ed., 1991), for a review of the establishment of a priority
system, its justifications and rationales. See Charlotte Villiers, Employees as Creditors: A Chal-
lenge for Justice in Insolvency Law 20 Co. L. 222 (1999), for a discussion of employee priority.
See also Susan Cantlie, Preferred Priority in Bankruptcy, in CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INTER-
NATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW (Jacob S. Ziegel ed. 1994); Ron-
ald Daniels, Stakeholders and Takeovers: Can Contractarianism be Compassionate?, 43 U.
TORONTO L.J. 315 (1993); Alan Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review
of Current Theories, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1981).
106. The priority is given to "wages, salaries, or commissions, including vacation, severance,
and sick leave pay earned by an individual." Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
598, § 507(a)(4), 92 Stat. 2549, 2584 (1978) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4) (2006)). Another
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placed in classes and paid over time, but only in full, and only if the
class accepts. There is no "cram down" of any class of priority credi-
tors, and so if the class does not accept the offered terms, the priority
creditors in that class must be paid in cash at confirmation. 107 None-
theless, since the priority of wages refers to a fixed sum, which is back-
ward-looking and limited in its scope, the ability of employees to
effectively leverage their preferential status over the content of the
plan is modest, and takes place only in small scale Chapter 11 cases
where the preferred debt holds relative significance. Paradoxically,
when preferential claims are significant, the scope for reorganization
is limited and liquidation seems to be the more probable alternative.
Thus, and as indeed is the case in large scale Chapter 11 proceedings,
preferential claims are paid in full at confirmation or before it, and
employees are left with no further protections or voice.
Lastly, once approved, the court will not question the merits of the
plan and its fairness. Chapter 11's financial test requires only two
things: first that a plan is "feasible,"10 8 which courts have interpreted
as "within its going concern value"; second, that it satisfies the best-
interest-of-creditors test,109 which is met if the plan would provide
creditors the same amount as they would have received under liquida-
tion. Accordingly, as Baird stated, "The plan is prepared by a group
that has a substantial interest in overvaluing the business for purposes
of Chapter 11 reorganization, and undervaluing the business for pur-
poses of Chapter 7 [governing liquidations]."110 Furthermore, in the
absence of any external office holder, the DIP controls the informa-
tion regarding the threshold that is provided. With low liquidation
value, any reorganization plan can satisfy the "best interest of credi-
tors" test. Through control over the information, the debtor is free to
suggest the steps required to achieve maximization of restructuring
value, presenting these steps as the only ones possible, secured by the
inability of others to challenge this assessment. Chapter 11 does re-
quire that information be made openly available,111 but significantly,
section caps the claims of an employee to one year. Id. § 502(b)(7) (codified at 11 U.S.C.
§ 502(b)(7)).
107. Id. § 1129(a)(9)(B) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(B)).
108. Id. § 1129(a)(11) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11)).
109. Id. § 1129(a)(7) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)).
110. DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRUrcy 254 (2001).
111. The debtor files schedules and reports of financial information at the commencement of,
and during the case, and must answer questions at meetings of creditors. The creditors' commit-
tee is entitled to obtain information under §§ 1102-3 and for a plan to be approved, a disclosure
statement must be provided. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, § 1103(c)(2) (codified at 11
U.S.C. § 1103(c)(2)). Before voting, voting parties are provided with a disclosure statement and
plan summary. Id. § 1125 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1125). The disclosure statement must include
374 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 10:347
the DIP mechanism allows the availability of only financial and trivial
data. The important information-regarding the business, its day-to-
day operations, its relationships with and within the labor force, and
with customers and suppliers-is only available through control. Ac-
cordingly, with no alternative plan available or practically formulated,
lack of independent information in the hands of creditors, and the
costs of delays and looming uncertainty, the DIP is placed in a strong
bargaining position.
In sum, the ability to classify claims permits the DIP to limit the
control of all creditors over the plan. The limited judicial scrutiny of
the content of the plan leaves the DIP with few constraints regarding
how the plan is formed. At the same time, since the DIP can remain
under bankruptcy protection for a long period of time, the most signif-
icant mechanisms which control the DIP-the time and acceptance
requirements-were practically eliminated from the legal scheme,
stripping the procedural protections for all creditors, employees, and
unsecured creditors more than others. By obtaining acceptance
through the prescribed majority of the voting classes, shareholders
and managers can retain their stakes in the post-Chapter 11 firm.
Therefore, the incentive is to practically remain under Chapter 11 pro-
tection as long as is needed to obtain the "consent" of the creditor
classes to the plan most beneficial from the perspective of the control-
lers. Based on this view, the issue in Chapter 11's success is hardly
whether or not the procedure ends in plan confirmation; rather, an
analysis should be made of the nature of the company that emerges
from the procedure, its long-term viability, and how the rights in this
entity are allocated between the pre-petition creditors.
3. Participation in Creditors' Committees
Under Chapter 11, the negotiation between the debtor and credi-
tors takes place through creditor committees that have the right to
obtain information and that hold direct access to the court to enforce
their rights. 112 From the early days of Chapter 11, trade union repre-
sentatives were permitted to participate in general, unsecured creditor
committees.113 The reasoning behind this, though, was the employees'
entitlement to payments of unpaid wages, rather than an equitable or
historical financial statements; pro forma financial statements forecasting future performance; a
statement of the assumed conditions upon which the pro forma statements are based; a descrip-
tion of claims and interests dealt with by the plan; and a listing of assets, with all information
relevant to their value in liquidation proceedings.
112. Id. §§ 1102-03 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1102-03).
113. In re Altair Airlines, Inc., 727 F.2d 88, 90-91 (3d Cir. 1984).
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proprietary basis for inclusion. Accordingly Chapter 11 includes no
structured participation by employees through committees. Indirectly
however, union members working under an existing CBA can be rep-
resented collectively during the negotiations that take place under
§ 1113 of the Code. Furthermore § 1114, which deals with the rejec-
tion of obligations under health and benefit plans to retired employ-
ees, presumes representation by a body representative of the retired
employees. Unlike § 1113, representation in § 1114 covers both or-
ganized and unorganized employees, since § 1114 relates to both.114
Although the representation of existing and former employees must
be logically separated, in practice the union represents the former em-
ployees as well.'1 5 If a court appoints a committee under § 1113 or
1114, it has the same rights, powers, and duties as a committee ap-
pointed under §§ 1102 and 1103, which govern the rights of regular
creditors' committees. Significantly, this allows for the retention of
professionals that can investigate matters, participate in the formula-
tion of a plan, request the appointment of a trustee or examiner, and
"perform such other services as are in the interest of those repre-
sented.""x6 Nevertheless, it is established that filing a motion under
§ 1114 does not require the court to appoint a committee. In Anchor
Glass Container for example, the court chose not to exercise its discre-
tion to appoint a committee since "the appointment of a commit-
tee would cause delay that would be detrimental to all parties in
interest," and so would frustrate the purpose of the legislation.' 17
In relation to non-unionized employees, or when a § 1113 proce-
dure has not been triggered, the Code allows the trustee to appoint
additional committees if it is appropriate."s The appointment of a
trustee is not obligatory; it is regarded as the exception rather than the
rule,119 and in practice it is only in some high profile cases that such a
trustee is appointed. Furthermore, § 1102(a)(2) provides that the
court may order the appointment of additional committees, either on
the request of a party with an interest in the proceedings or on the
request of the trustee "to ensure adequate representation."120 As the
code provides little guidance on the terms for such an appointment,
114. See In re Horizon Nat'I Res. Co., 316 BR. 268, 275 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2004).
115. See Allied Chem. Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 173 (1971) (dis-
cussing the Supreme Court going so far as to suggest that unions have "internal conflicts" when
they seek to represent both active employees and retirees in labor negotiations).
116. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, § 1103(c) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c)).
117. In re Anchor Glass Container Corp., 342 BR. 878 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005).
118. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, § 1102(a)(1) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1)).
119. In re Sharon Steel Corp., 871 F.2d 1217, 1225-26 (3d Cir. 1989).
120. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2).
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courts have developed the law on a case-by-case basis.121 In the En-
ron debacle, for example, with an estimated twenty thousand affected
employees and retirees, an employment-related issues committee was
formed, following a request by the trustee. This unique committee
had the legal power to take sworn statements and subpoena docu-
ments and witnesses. Following the establishment of this committee, a
$29 million severance settlement was reached according to which for-
mer employees received a one-time payment of $7,000 to $8,000.122 It
seems, however, that this does not signify a new development in
Chapter 11. Other special interest committees were formed in recent
cases, but in no other reported case has a committee representative of
employee interests been formed.123 The case of Enron, its high profile
collapse, the corruption involved, and the fact that the company was,
effectively, completely liquidated is unique. Mismanagement led to
the loss of pension funds established through defined contribution
schemes and so employees lost significant benefits acquired in the
past.124 Many of Enron's management, including its CEO and CFO,
although permitted to remain in control, were under criminal investi-
gation.125 It is thus only with reference to these unusual circumstances
that the appointment of an employee representative committee
should be seen. The reluctance of the courts to appoint special credi-
tor committees or indeed to appoint a trustee, has been part of the
judicial campaign to strengthen the control of the debtor and to facili-
tate a constructive restructuring environment.
4. Sale of Assets While Undergoing Chapter 11 Reorganization
Absent structured participation, the negotiation process between
the DIP and its employees shifts to the familiar collective bargaining
process, which is affected by indirect regulations. During restructur-
ing negotiations and while under Chapter 11 protection, perhaps the
most powerful tool in the hands of the DIP is the ability to dispose of
assets which are "inefficient" to maintain. Section 363(c) of the Bank-
121. See Mary J. Wiggins, Finance and Factionalism: The Uneasy Present (and Future) of Spe-
cial Interest Committees in Corporate Reorganization Law, 41 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 1373 (2004).
122. Id. at 1378.
123. During the collapse of Global Crossing in 2002, for example, the company dismissed
1,500 employees and paid about eighteen million dollars in severance and vacation pay. Of the
thirty-two million dollars owed to approximately 1,200 employees, $5.5 million was entitled to
priority payment. The US trustee and the court refused the application to set up an employee
representative committee.
124. Steven L. Willborn, Workers in Troubled Firms: When are (Should) They be Protected?, 7
U. PA. J.L. & EMP. L. 35, 47 (2004).
125. LoPUCKI, supra note 50, at 148 (discussing the role of Enron's pre-bankruptcy
management).
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ruptcy Code allows certain types of sales to be conducted in the regu-
lar course of business and Congress designed the Code to preserve
ongoing value when undergoing a bankruptcy procedure.126 Section
363(b), on the other hand, provides a mechanism by which the com-
pany controller may use, sell, or lease assets outside the ordinary
course of business.
The drafters of § 363 probably thought in terms of sales of particu-
lar assets, not entire businesses. 127 Nonetheless, this ability to sell as-
sets during Chapter 11 reorganization has taken a central role in
Chapter 11 reorganizations, especially in labor-management-conflict-
driven reorganizations. Baird and Rasmussen have argued, "Rarely is
Chapter 11 a forum where the various stakeholders in a publicly held
firm negotiate among each other over the firm's destiny."1 28 They ar-
gue that in effect, Chapter 11 has become a foreclosure procedure in
which burdening liabilities are dismissed, the company is refinanced,
and its capital structure is restructured. Only then-when other alter-
natives are absent-does the company put itself before the creditors
for approval. This explains the length of time companies remain
under Chapter 11 protection: it is not to prepare a reorganization plan
but rather to implement one, while keeping free of significant legal or
bargaining constraints. In recent years, this method of partial liquida-
tion has swelled to the point that the real restructuring of the firm
effectively takes place before any plan is submitted for approval.129 In
this context, the entire business, rather than just parts of it, is routinely
put up for sale during a Chapter 11 procedure 30 while liquidation
sales before a Chapter 11 reorganization are confirmed through credi-
tors' votes, rendering the approval process and the plan confirmation
stage practically irrelevant, and only of academic interest.131 In cir-
126. The section applies to Chapters 7, 11, 12 and 13 of the Bankruptcy Code Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, § 103(a) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 103(a)).
127. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 181-84 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6141-45.
128. Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV.
751, 752 (2003); George W. Kuney, Misinterpreting Bankruptcy Code Section 363(f) and Under-
mining the Chapter II Process, 76 AM. BANK. L.J. 235 (2002).
129. See Jason Brege, An Efficient Model of Section 363(B) Sales, 92 VA. L. REV. 1639, 1641
(2006) (mentioning several things: TWA's sale of its planes and landing gates to American Air-
lines; Enron's sale of principal assets and main pipe line within a few months of filing its bank-
ruptcy petition; Budget's sale of its main assets to its parent company Avis, within few weeks of
petition; and Polaroid's sale of assets to the private equity group BankOne, all of which occurred
before a restructure plan was presented for creditors' approval).
130. See also infra Part IV (regarding the § 363 sale of Chrysler and GM).
131. Brege, supra note 129, at 1642. See LoPUCKI, supra note 50, at 168 (indicating that be-
tween 2001 and 2006, twenty-one large publicly held corporations sold the whole of their busi-
ness by applying § 363 before plan approval).
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cumventing the necessity for plan confirmation, such sales introduce
into the negotiations an additional source of pressure on the company
employees, pressuring them to compromise before they are presented
with a "done deal." The transformation of Chapter 11 into a foreclo-
sure mechanism through § 363 is attributed to the emergence of se-
cured creditor-driven reorganizations, rather than just to the
attractiveness of this possibility to the DIP. For finance providers, as-
set sales present the fastest and most definite way to secure returns on
their loans, especially when the loans are over-secured, 132 without be-
ing subjected to the balancing of competing interests that the plan
confirmation process was designed to achieve.
Therefore, § 363(b) of the Bankruptcy Code is perhaps one of
Chapter 11's most central components. Such a sale requires only a
notice to the creditors' committee and a hearing before the bank-
ruptcy court, 133 while the burden of proof in any objection to the sale
is placed on the creditor opposing it.134 Furthermore, beyond disclo-
sure of the terms of the sale, § 363 does not include any disclosure
requirement, as opposed to § 1125(b), which concerns the disclosure
requirements necessary before a court approves a plan. Absent de-
tailed disclosure of reasons for sale along with alternatives to and mo-
tives for selling, a limited possibility of objecting to the sale exists.
This means that a hearing may not even be held, since the grounds for
objection may not be available to opposing creditors. The standards
for approving a sale are minimal and vague, and central to these stan-
dards is the "good faith" requirement, generally meaning an opportu-
nity to obtain competing offers.135 In In re Lionel Corp., the court
maintained that it should be careful in establishing rigid standards
when interpreting Chapter 11 to enable the facilitation of reorganiza-
tions as Congress intended.136 Following In re Lionel Corp., the
courts abandoned a "necessity test" 137 and began to consistently re-
132. Kenneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter
11, 1 J. LEGAL ANAL. 511, 551 (2009).
133. The notice must be sent to all creditors, or the unsecured creditors' committee, and must
contain a description of the terms and conditions of the sale, along with time specification for
filing objections. Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 363(b)(1), 92 Stat. 2549, 2572 (1978) (codified at 11
U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2006)).
134. Id. (placing the burden of proof on 'an interest holder' only with relation to showing an
interest in the asset sold).
135. In re Abbotts Dairies of Pa., Inc., 788 F.2d 143 (3d Cir. 1986).
136. Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063, 1070
(2d Cir. 1983) ("Chapter 5 of the House Bill dealing with reorganizations states that the purpose
of a business reorganization is to restructure a business' finances to enable it to operate produc-
tively, provide jobs for its employees, pay its creditors and produce a return for its
stockholders.").
137. See In re Solar Mfg. Corp., 176 F.2d 493 (3d Cir. 1949).
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quire only a "good business reason" to approve such sales. Under this
flexible and lenient standard, courts will usually consider several fac-
tors: the proportionate value of the assets to the estate as a whole; the
amount of time elapsed since the filing; the likelihood that a plan of
reorganization will be proposed and confirmed in the near future; the
effect of the proposed disposition on future plans or reorganizations;
the proceeds to be obtained from the disposition; and whether the
asset is increasing or decreasing in value.138
Some authors have suggested that these ongoing Chapter 11 sales
are prone to agency costs and pricing below market value: pre-bank-
ruptcy entitlements may not be respected, and minimal court interfer-
ence combined with a constrained market for assets could lead to
depressed prices and lower recovery for creditors than they would
otherwise obtain through the normal confirmation process.139 Often,
sales are made to insiders with superior information and through
"sweetheart deals." 140 Thus, either the sale is made to managers (in
small and medium size companies) or managers push the sale forward
in return for stock options, retention of bonuses, or consultation con-
tracts.141 Furthermore, § 363(f) of the Code offers the buyer the ben-
efit of an asset with a title free and clear of claims.142 Appeals of the
sale are only permissible under § 363(m), which requires the objector
to obtain a stay pending appeal that is only available when the pur-
chaser has not acted in good faith. Thus the sale is not only easy and
fast, but it is also most likely final. Whether such sales are efficient or
not remains uncertain. However, as an alternative "de facto" exit
strategy from Chapter 11, such sales are undoubtedly attractive to the
secured creditor, who, wishes to reduce risks as soon as possible and
will be paid first according to his priority of claim. Secured creditors
thus have an interest in any sale which guarantees payment regardless
of any surplus lost in the process. Accordingly, as ties with the DIP
138. See In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d at 1070. Additional factors in the business justification
standard require that the sale be adequately and reasonably noticed. Fleet Nat'l Bank v. Door-
crafters (In re N. Atl. Millwork Corp.), 155 B.R. 271, 275 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1993). The disposi-
tion must be "fair and expeditious." In re White Motor Credit Corp., 14 B.R. 584, 591 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1981).
139. Brege, supra note 129, at 1644; Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Bankruptcy Fire
Sales, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2007). The efficiency case against such sales is disputed while some
commentators claim that a § 363(b) sale is actually more efficient than the lengthy confirmation
process.
140. See Elizabeth B. Rose, Chocolate, Flowers, and §363(B): The Opportunity of Sweetheart
Deals Without Chapter 11 Protections, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 249 (2006) (reviewing inside
dealing and other DIP misappropriation).
141. LOPUCKI, supra note 50, at 174.
142. Assuming that a notice to an interest holder was given. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014.
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and influence over it increase-for example, through DIP financing
arrangements-such sales will increasingly take place in circumstances
where the asset is prone to be undervalued. 143
Inefficient as such sales may be, courts can perhaps correct these
inefficiencies through increased scrutiny and better information flow
to creditors. Such steps are necessary both to reduce the frequency of
such sales and to increase the efficiency of the market valuation when
such sales take place. However, the role of these sales as a source of
pressure on non-consenting parties during the pre-plan negotiation
stage, and in shattering the balance that Chapter 11 was originally in-
tended to create, cannot be eliminated through procedural measures
alone. In our context, the availability of such sales is a source of im-
mense pressure on the company employees, casting its shadow over
the negotiation process and pushing employees to agree to a plan con-
taining terms that they and other unsecured creditors would have
never agreed through Chapter 11's regular plan confirmation process.
The combination of the establishment of Chapter 11 as a cause for
termination of the employment contract, together with the ability to
sell company assets while under Chapter 11 protection and effectively
restructure the business absent an approved reorganization plan, re-
sults in the labor force itself being restructured whilst its company is
under Chapter 11 protection. This is a far cry from the envisioned
multi-party negotiation process that the Code originally intended to
establish.
5. Transfer of the Employment Contract
It is evident that a central threat to the employees is that their plant
will be sold while their company undergoes a Chapter 11 reorganiza-
tion, prior to plan confirmation and without any ability to block the
sale. As discussed, non-unionized employees cannot do much to pre-
vent such sales, and a purchaser of assets of ongoing operations is not
statutorily obligated to assume the predecessor's employment agree-
ments.144 This is so even if the employees were working under the
terms of a CBA, absent a superseding contractual obligation. How-
ever, most CBAs do contain a "successorship clause."145 Under these
circumstances, it is a requirement that the CBA be terminated before
143. See Stuart C. Gilson et al., Valuation of Bankrupt Firms, 13 REV. FIN. SruD. 43, 45
(2000).
144. NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs. Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 279 (1972).
145. Ketterman, supra note 6.
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the plant is transferred or, alternatively, a negotiated modification of
the collective agreement is agreed with the union.146
Chapter 11 establishes a procedure under which a CBA can be
modified or terminated. Section 1113, which will be further discussed
below, requires both negotiation in good faith and a judicial proce-
dure for termination. Thus, a preferred course of action for the
debtor, one which is allowed by the courts, is to sell its assets and then
ask to repudiate the CBA under § 1113. After such a sale takes effect,
there is no practical reason to maintain the labor force and so repudia-
tion becomes "necessary," a central requirement to repudiate a CBA.
This issue has been subject to uncertainty in since the late 1990s. In
In re Lady H. Coal Co.,1 4 7 the court denied a rejection application
following the sale of assets upon the finding that the debtor made no
effort to find a buyer who would negotiate with the union, appeared
to have ignored a potential purchaser who was willing to do so, and
obligated itself to a "sweetheart" deal for the benefit of insiders. In
this case, the court granted a free sale of the assets, but denied the
motion of the debtor to reject the existing CBA, since the debtor had
agreed to the sale of its assets unencumbered by its CBA before seek-
ing rejection. The court held that "a debtor has a duty under § 1113 to
not oblige itself prior to negotiations with its union employees"; that
no bargain with the employees could have taken place in good faith
under these circumstances; and that "employee creditors are pro-
tected by the right to file claims for breach of the [labor agreement]
with such damages to be satisfied by payments from the proceeds of
sale." 148
Following Lady H, United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Lo-
cal 211 v. Family Snacks, Inc. (Family Snacks)149 involved a Chapter
11, § 363 sale of a producer and distributer of potato chips and other
packaged food. This was followed by a repudiation application under
§ 1113. Contrary to the Lady H., previous cases had confirmed that a
Chapter 11 piecemeal sale of the company assets allows for rejection
of a CBA, because once assets are sold, repudiation becomes "neces-
sary" to the conclusion of the company restructuring. 50 In Family
Snacks, while referring to the legislative purpose of "facilitating cor-
porate restructures," the court held that a requirement that would ne-
146. See USW v. Cooper-Standard Auto., No. 1:04-CV-358-TS, 2004 WL 2599132 (N.D. Ind.
Nov. 2, 2004).
147. In re Lady H. Coal Co., 193 B.R. 233, 242 (Bankr. S.D. W.Va. 1996).
148. Id.
149. UFCW, Local 211 v. Family Snacks, Inc. (In re Family Snacks, Inc.), 257 B.R. 884 (B.A.P.
8th Cir. 2001).
150. See In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 134 B.R. 515, 517 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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cessitate negotiations prior to a sale would effectively push companies
who are preparing piecemeal or ongoing concern sales to move into
Chapter 7, which governs company liquidation. Because this was not
the intention of the legislation, the court held
that there are practical problems with the union's position that ne-
gotiations for rejection must occur before a sale . . . . In certain
factual settings, the union's position would make it impossible for a
debtor to accept the highest and best offer for its assets and would
precipitate the loss of potential purchasers to the detriment of all
other creditors. It is difficult to accept the argument that § 1113 was
designed to give a union the power to so strangle a debtor's at-
tempts to reorganize through liquidation.' 51
Thus, in this case, the court firmly established that confirming a rejec-
tion of a plan under § 1113 could happen before, in conjunction with,
or after the business was sold under § 363. Thus, committing to a sale
of the whole business, or parts of it, and only later making an applica-
tion to repudiate the CBA, would not, on its own, be regarded as bad
faith.
Thus, under these narrow circumstances where a CBA with a suc-
cesorship clause exists, the debtor may sell assets or the whole busi-
ness free from contractual obligations towards the related employees,
and only later ask to reject the relevant CBA by making a § 1113 ap-
plication. Negotiations with employees, accordingly, are held in the
shadow of these rules and of course push trade union members to
agree to extensive concessions driven by factual necessities and legal
constraints. Absent agreement, the debtor is free to seek rejection of
the collective agreement under § 1113. The only issue that remains is
what, accordingly, are the substantive requirements of § 1113 and how
do they shape the negotiation procedure in which the available op-
tions are constrained by the reality of a probable sale of the business.
6. Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements
As already mentioned, U.S. labor law permits the unilateral rejec-
tion of the employment contract of non-unionized workers, and so
does Chapter 11. With regard to those employees who work under
the terms of a CBA, most CBAs provide that an employer may only
discharge employees for "just cause." However, economic downturns
that give rise to bankruptcy are regarded as such causes. 152 Further-
more, Chapter 11 provides an exception to the rule that the law for-
bids the unilateral rejection of existing collective bargaining
151. In re Family Snacks, Inc., 257 B.R. at 897.
152. Willborn, supra note 124, at 37.
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agreements. 153 Thus, in relation to CBAs, Chapter 11 establishes a
detailed framework under which a CBA can be voided and within
which the negotiations towards a new agreement must take place.
The law prior to the enactment of Chapter 11 permitted the control-
ler to dismiss executory contracts within the limits of the "business
judgment rule." 154 The courts recognized, however, that CBAs are
unusual executory contracts and so applied a more stringent standard
than the business judgment rule, while at the same time leaving cer-
tain discretions with the DIP.155 The Second Circuit established the
rule in Shopmen's Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Products15 6 and
Brotherhood of Railway Airline and S.S. Clerks v. R.E.A. Express Inc.
that the standard for rejection was a situation in which a rejection of
the agreement would lead to collapse of the firm and loss of jobs, thus
applying a test akin to a "necessity" requirement.157
As we have seen, this option-albeit a constrained one-of re-
jecting a CBA did not concern labor representatives in the period of
time leading up to the enactment of the 1978 reform, and thus, they
did not feel the need to negotiate detailed provisions to govern the
issue.'58 Perhaps to their surprise then, in February 1984, in the case
of NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco,159 involving the reorganization of a
medium-sized construction company, the Supreme Court ruled that
CBAs are executory contracts subject to the general terms of § 365 of
the Code, permitting the debtor to renounce such contracts. The
Court held that this was consistent with the collective nature of Chap-
ter 11 and its intended purpose of facilitating corporate restructuring.
In applying § 365, the Court established that the standard for rejec-
tion, although stricter than the business judgment rule, falls short of
the absolute necessity test. Accordingly, a court may permit a debtor
to reject a CBA if the debtor can prove that the agreement burdens
the estate and that the "balance of equities" weighs in favor of rejec-
tion, taking into account the interest of all parties in the bankruptcy
case.160 In addition, the Court held that before it approves repudia-
tion of a CBA, the parties must persuade it that they made reasonable
153. The National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 1, 49 Stat. 449, 449 (1935) (codi-
fied at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006)) (prohibiting the modification of collective agreements unilater-
ally, while establishing that to do so, would amount to an "unfair labor practice.").
154. UK Bankruptcy Act, 1869, 32 & 33 Vict. ch. 71 (Eng.).
155. See David L. Gregory, Labor Contract Rejection in Bankruptcy: The Supreme Court's
Attack on Labor in NLRB v. Bildisco, 25 B.C. L. REV. 539, 561 (1984).
156. Shopmen's Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Prods., 519 F.2d 698, 704 (2d Cir. 1975).
157. Bhd. of Ry. v. REA Express Inc., 523 F.2d 164, 169 (2d Cir. 1975).
158. See supra Part III(B)(1).
159. NLRB v. Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
160. Id. at 526.
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efforts to negotiate a voluntary modification. 16 1 Lastly, the Court
stated that rejecting such an agreement before securing the permission
of a bankruptcy judge does not amount to unfair labor practice under
the National Labor Relations Act.162
The Bildisco decision immediately served as an incentive to reor-
ganize early through Chapter 11 with the strategic purpose of altering
an existing CBA. 163 Only following this development did trade unions
lobby in Congress to overrule the Bildisco decision.164 In 1984, fol-
lowing these efforts, Congress introduced § 1113 into Chapter 11 as
part of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act.165
The debtor's attempted rejection of retiree benefit contracts in the
first LTV steel reorganization of 1988 precipitated Congress's passage
of § 1114.166 While §§ 1113 and 1114 do not prohibit repudiation of
collective agreements or retiree benefit plans, they attempt to estab-
lish the terms under which such repudiation may take place, while cre-
ating procedural and substantive conditions governing the rejection of
collective agreements. Congress legislated both §§ 1113 and 1114 with
the interest of employees in mind. It is also interesting to note the
ease in which labor lobbying obtained bankruptcy protections, once
they identified the risks associated with Chapter 11.
Under a § 1113 procedure, the debtor must bargain before rejecting
the contract, but if bargaining in good faith does not produce an
agreement, the court has to be convinced that the "balance of equi-
ties" favors rejection. 167 The courts have distilled nine steps under
§ 1113(b) and (c) as prerequisites to rejection of a collective bargain-
ing agreement: (1) the debtor must make a proposal to the union to
161. Id.
162. Id. at 532.
163. See CARRUTHERS & HALLIDAY, supra note 67, at 337 (illustrating the case of Wilson
Foods Corporation, who filed for Chapter 11 protection in 1984 while solvent, repudiated its
labor contracts covering 6,000 employees, and reduced wages between forty and fifty percent).
164. See Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 791 F.2d 1074, 1082
(3d Cir. 1986) ("[Wlhen the Supreme Court announced its decision NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco
on February 24, 1984, labor groups mounted an immediate and intense lobbying effort in con-
gress to change the law.").
165. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 541,
98 Stat. 333, 390-91 (1984) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1113 (2006)).
166. See Leslie T. Gladstone, Retiree Benefits Bankruptcy Protection Act of 1988: Welfare
Benefits in Need of Reform, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 427 (1991), for the history of the enactment of
§ 1114.
167. Under § 1113(e) an interim relief from a collective bargaining agreement may be ob-
tained if it is "essential to the continuation of the debtor's business, or in order to avoid irrepara-
ble damage to the estate." Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, § 541
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §1113(e) (2006)). Lately, these standards were declared to be more strin-
gent then the business judgment rule. See In re Delta Airlines Inc., 359 B.R. 491, 498 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2007).
2012] THE TRAJECTORY OF LABOR RELATIONS UNDER CHAPTER 11 385
modify the collective bargaining agreement; (2) the proposal must be
based on the most complete and reliable information available at the
time of the proposal; (3) the proposed modifications must be neces-
sary to permit the reorganization of the debtor; (4) the proposed mod-
ifications must ensure that all creditors, the debtor, and all affected
parties are treated fairly and equitably; (5) the debtor must provide
the union with such relevant information as is necessary to evaluate
the proposal; (6) the debtor must meet at reasonable times with the
union during the period between making the proposal and hearing the
motion; (7) the debtor must confer in good faith and attempt to reach
mutually satisfactory modifications of the agreement; (8) the union
must have refused to accept the debtor's proposal without good cause;
and (9) the balance of equities must clearly favor rejection.168
The debtor must satisfy all of these standards to confirm rejection.
However, the first, second, fifth and sixth parts of the test are usually
perfunctorily mentioned by the court and then brushed off without
substantial analysis. For example, § 1113(b)(1)(B) & § 1114(f)(1)(B)
require the debtor to provide the negotiating representative with
"such relevant information as is necessary to evaluate the proposal."
Although in a recent case a court denied an application for rejection
of a CBA because a debtor refused to turn over its financial modeling
software to the unions, 169 usually, rather than forcing the debtor to
meet its burden of proof, courts merely require that a debtor come
forward with the information it has provided the union. 170 In In re
Texas Sheet Metals, Inc.,171 the union asserted that the debtor had not
used the most recent financial information available, but the court
placed the burden on the union of specifying the information re-
quired, effectively reducing its ability to oppose the extent and rele-
vance of the information produced, thus transforming the requirement
to mere formality.
168. In re Am. Provision Co., 44 B.R. 907, 909 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984). See also UFCW,
Local 211 v. Family Snacks, Inc. (In re Family Snacks, Inc.), 257 B.R., 884, 892 (B.A.P. 8th Cir.
2001); United Food & Commercial Workers Local Union v. Appletree Mkts, Inc. (In re Apple-
tree Mkts., Inc), 155 B.R. 431, 437-38 (S.D. Tex. 1993); In re Elec. Contracting Servs. Co., 305
B.R. 22, 26 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2003); Nat'l Forge Co. v. Indep. Union of Nat'l Forge Empls. (In re
Nat'l Forge Co.), 289 B.R. 803 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2003). See also Judith D. Nichols, Rejection of
Collective Bargaining Agreements by Chapter 11 Debtors: The Necessity Requirement Under Sec-
tion 1113, 21 GA. L. REV. 967, 989-90 (1987); Mitchell Rait, Rejection of Collective Bargaining
Agreement Under Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code: The Second Circuit Enters the Arena, 63
AM. BANKR. L.J. 355, 370 (1989).
169. In re Mesaba Aviation Inc., 341 B.R. 693, 713 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2006).
170. Ann J. McClain, Bankruptcy Code Section 1113 and the Simple Rejection of Collective
Bargaining Agreements: Labor Loses Again, 80 GEo. L.J. 191, 198-99 (1991).
171. In re Tex. Sheet Metals, Inc., 90 B.R. 260 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1988).
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Most often when courts deny § 1113 relief to a debtor, it is on the
grounds of failure to negotiate or bargain in "good faith" (term 7),
failure to show that the debtor's proposal was "fair and equitable"
(term 4), or failure to meet the "necessity" standard (term 3).172 The
issue becomes one of balancing the need to reorganize against the
concessions asked for by the union. Inevitably, the court's assessment
of the proposed agreement is influenced by the political views of the
particular judge on the vested rights held by employees in their work
place.17 3 As McClain argued,"[The] courts have construed each of the
nine elements broadly and have placed greater emphasis on those
parts of the test that permit subjective analysis, giving the debtor more
room to maneuver. "174 For example, when the courts consider the
fourth test, namely that the proposed modifications are "fair and equi-
table," they may choose to compare the pay cuts of unionized and
non-unionized workers.175 Most courts, however, look at the reasona-
bleness of the union wage cuts in isolation. 176 As for the good faith
requirement, courts have interpreted it broadly and have not
presented many difficulties to the debtor. The court will usually look
into the course of negotiations, the details of each proposal and coun-
terproposal, the number and length of meetings, and the information
exchanged. 77 However, a one-sided proposal,178 or a mere four day
interval between the debtor's presentation of the proposal to the
union and the debtor's filing, have not been regarded as contrary to
good faith.179 In In re Allied Delivery System, 80 the bankruptcy court
held that the good faith requirement was met as long as negotiations
were held, regardless of their nature. On the other hand, courts have
held that a debtor's refusal to negotiate after a plan was submitted
constituted bad faith and justified the denial of its application under
172. Michael L. Bernstein, American Workers in Crisis: Does the Chapter 11 Business Bank-
ruptcy Law Treat Employees and Retirees Fairly?, 26 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 10 (2007).
173. N.Y. Typographical Union No. 6 v. Maxwell Newspapers, Inc. (In re Maxwell Newspa-
pers, Inc.), 981 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1992) ("This statute requires unions to face those changed
circumstances that occur when a company becomes insolvent, and it requires all affected parties
to compromise in the face of financial hardship. At the same time, § 1113 also imposes require-
ments on the debtor to prevent it from using bankruptcy as a judicial hammer to break the
union.").
174. McClain, supra note 170, at 198.
175. See In re Am. Provision Co., 44 B.R. 907, 910 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984).
176. McClain, supra note 170, at 200.
177. Bernstein, supra note 172, at 12.
178. In re Tex. Sheet Metals, Inc., 90 B.R. 260, 271 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1988).
179. In re Century Brass Prods., 55 B.R. 712, 716 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1985), rev'd on other
grounds, 795 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1986).
180. In re Allied Delivery Sys., 49 B.R. 700, 703 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
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§§ 1113 and 1114.181 The burden of proof was originally placed on the
debtor to show that it was negotiated in good faith.182 Nonetheless,
contrary to the literal reading of § 1113, the courts have placed the
burden on the union, once a meeting is held.'83 The reversal of the
burden of proof was used by the courts to further limit the union's
ability to object to rejection in other contexts as well, such as in the
context of showing that relevant financial information was not availa-
ble.184 Furthermore, in relation to the requirement that the union
may not reject a debtor's proposal without good cause, the courts usu-
ally conclude that any rejection by the union is without good cause. 8 .5
Thus, for example, in In re Royal Composing Room, the Second Cir-
cuit held that when a union takes a hard-line position, rejection of a
proposed CBA is almost always without good cause.186
Courts have focused a large part of the judicial consideration of the
terms for rejection on § 1113(b)(1)(A), under which a debtor must
propose only "those necessary modifications in the employees bene-
fits and protections that are necessary to permit the reorganization of
the debtor . . . " (the third element of the nine-part § 1113 test), which
was described as "the focal point of courts' decisions to reject
CBAs."187 The Third Circuit interpreted the necessity requirement
strictly, equating "necessary" with "essential," and hence allowing
only the minimum modifications that are absolutely essential to per-
mit the debtor to reorganize.' 88 However, the Second Circuit rejected
this approach and interpreted the necessity requirement as demanding
that "its proposal is made in good faith and that it contains necessary,
but not absolutely minimal, changes that will enable the debtor to
complete the reorganization process successfully."1 89 It now seems
settled that most courts will follow the Second Circuit's less strict in-
terpretation of what modifications are permitted.190 With regard to
§ 1114, it seems that a more stringent application of the necessity test
181. See In re Delta Airlines Inc., 342 B.R. 685, 694-97 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).
182. Nat'l Forge Co. v. Indep. Union of Nat'1 Forge Empls. (In re Nat'l Forge Co.), 279 B.R.
493, 500 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2002).
183. McClain, supra note 170, at 202.
184. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
185. McClain, supra note 170, at 203.
186. N.Y. Typographical Union No. 6 v. Royal Composing Room, Inc. (In re Royal Compos-
ing Room, Inc.), 848 F.2d 345, 349 (2d Cir. 1988).
187. McClain, supra note 170, at 208.
188. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp v. United Steelworkers of Am., 791 F.2d 1074, 1088 (3d
Cir. 1986).
189. Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey Transp. Inc., 816 F 2d 82, 90 (2d Cir. 1987).
190. John D. Ayer, The Intersection of Chapter 11 and Labor Law, 26 AM. BANKR. INST. L.J.
May 2007, at 22.
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may be applied, as the Congressional sponsors of § 1114 expressed
their intent to codify the strict interpretation of the "necessary" stan-
dard enunciated in Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel.191 Lastly, the ninth re-
quirement of § 1113, that the balance of equities "clearly favor
rejection of the collective bargaining agreement," has almost been
equated with the Bildisco standard, which supports such rejection in
favor of achieving Chapter 11's purpose: achieving and approving a
restructuring plan.192
Thus, effectively, DIP can unilaterally reject the collective agree-
ment in the expectation of minimal court interference.193 Indeed, al-
though § 1113 was envisioned as a pro-employee response to Bildisco,
it has actually placed employees in a worse position because it codi-
fied Bildisco's substantive standards while its components have be-
come a mere formality through judicial interpretation. 194 Since courts
see the purpose of Chapter 11 as being to "facilitate restructurings,"
they tend to assess the required balancing in a way that favors the
debtor, regarding employees as potential obstacles preventing success-
ful restructurings. Thus, courts will opt to reject considerations and
doctrines of collective labor law when interpreting § 1113. For exam-
ple, the National Labor Relations Act requires the debtor to bargain
in good faith with the union, otherwise this will constitute an "unfair
labor practice" in accordance with § 8(a)(5) and subsection (b)(3).
Since claims regarding such unfair practices are adjudicated by the
National Labor Relations Board, a substantial degree of interpreta-
tion of the good faith requirement was undertaken by a judicial body
with employee credentials.195 However, the courts explicitly avoided
transposing these established interpretations into their adjudication.
For example, the bankruptcy court in In re Kentucky Truck Sales held
that Congress did not intend it to interpret the good faith test of the
§ 1113 test in compliance with labor law precedents.196 Similarly, in In
191. 134 CONG. REC. S. 6823-27 (daily ed. May 26, 1988) (statement of Sen. Howard
Metzenbaum).
192. Although the balance of equities must "clearly" favor rejection rather than just "militate
in favor." See In re Ind. Grocery Co., 136 B.R. 182, 196 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1990).
193. There are several cases involving the rejection of a collective bargaining agreement. See
generally N.Y. Typographical Union No. 6 v. Maxwell Newspapers, Inc. (In re Maxwell Newspa-
pers, Inc.), 981 F.2d 85 (2d 1992); Sheet Metals Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. Mile Hi Metal Sys., Inc.
(In re Mile Hi Metal Sys., Inc.), 899 F.2d 887 (10th Cir. 1990); N.Y. Typographical Union No. 6 v.
Royal Composing Room, Inc. (In re Royal Composing Room, Inc.), 848 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1988);
Truck Drives Local 807 v. Carey Transp. Inc., 816 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1987); In re Salt Creek Freight-
ways, 46 B.R. 347 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985).
194. See McClain, supra note 170.
195. 29 U.S.C. §§ 153-54.
196. In re Ky. Truck Sales, 52 B.R. 797, 801 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985).
2012] THE TRAJECTORY OF LABOR RELATIONS UNDER CHAPTER 11 389
re Century Brass Products, the court noted that § 1113 was not in-
tended to import traditional labor law into the bankruptcy court.197 If
anything, the courts consider labor law precedents when it is benefi-
cial to the debtor. For example, in In re Texas Sheet Metals, Inc., the
court, while relying on labor law doctrines, required the union to pre-
sent a counterproposal under the good faith test.198 Consequently, as
McClain stated, nearly every decision since 1984 has granted the
debtor's petition for rejection of the collective bargaining
agreement.199
Following the rejection of a collective agreement under § 1113, the
debtor remains an employer and continues to be obligated to bargain
collectively with the employees' certified bargaining representatives
over the terms of a new CBA.200 However, in all major disputes be-
tween employees and the DIP in the context of Chapter 11 reorgani-
zations, after a § 1113 rejection of a CBA, the debtor can effectively
impose a new collective contract unilaterally. 20' Thus, employees are
left with little bargaining power and with no choice (or effective lever-
age) other than to strike. 202 Such a course of action cannot be freely
practiced since it can also harm the interests of employees by poten-
tially destroying the business itself. However, by casting its shadow
over collective negotiations, it can nonetheless leave some leverage in
the hands of employees. Courts traditionally permit this course of ac-
tion after a § 1113 rejection of a CBA, despite the fact that the origi-
nal agreement usually contains both a no-strike clause and a grievance
and arbitration procedure. 203 This also makes sense, as the termina-
tion of a CBA must be seen as a unilateral action, which takes the
197. In re Century Brass Prods., 55 B.R. 712, 716 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1985), rev'd on other
grounds, 795 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1986).
198. In re Tex. Sheet Metal, Inc., 90 B.R. 260, 262 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1988).
199. McClain, supra note 170, at 205.
200. NLRB v. Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 534 (1984).
201. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 105, 92 Stat. 2549, 2555 (1978)
(codified at 11 U.S.C. § 105 (2006)) (indicating that the court holds general equitable power to
reject the CBA in whole or in part).
202. Note that this course of action is, of course, not available to retirees. Several statutes
form the legal framework, which govern the legal framework which governs the collective bar-
gaining process outside the insolvency context. The Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88
(2000) (governing the railway and airline industry); The National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-69 (2006); The Norris LaGuardia Act 1932, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-15 (2006) (governing the
collective bargaining process in other industries).
203. N.Y. Typographical Union No. 6 v. Royal Composing Room, Inc. (In re Royal Compos-
ing Room, Inc.), 62 B.R. 403, 405 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986), affd, 848 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1988)
(confirming the right to strike in such circumstances). As a general rule, under U.S. law, the
Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibits the courts from enjoining a dispute concerning "the terms and
conditions of employment." The Norris LaGuardia Act 1932, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-15 (2006). But
see Boys Markets Inc. v. Retail Clerk's Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 253-56 (1970) (holding
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dispute outside the realm of the mandatory negotiation process de-
signed by the general rules that govern the collective bargaining pro-
cess. As established under labor law, once negotiations fail, both sides
are allowed to resort to self-help without judicial interference. 204
However, the U.S. appellate courts recently curtailed this right to
strike following a § 1113 procedure in the case of Northwest Airlines
Corporation v. Association of Flight Attendants. 205 In Northwest, the
court held that the prohibition on enjoining a labor dispute did not
bar a court injunction against a strike since the union's proposed
strike, after the bankruptcy court's rejection of the CBA, would vio-
late the union's separate and fundamental duty under the law "to ex-
ert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements . . . and
to settle all disputes." 206 To justify this intervention in the mecha-
nisms of labor disputes governed by both Chapter 11 and labor laws,
the court suggested that a strike may put the airline out of business
and so a prohibition on such measures aligns with the overriding ob-
jective of Chapter 11 to facilitate corporate restructuring and protect
the variety of stakeholders dependent on the firm's survival.207
In any event, the ability to strike following a § 1113 procedure is a
secondary issue, as is the application of § 1113 itself. If we focus on
the cases in which an agreement with the labor force was not reached
and where § 1113 was applied or a strike took place, we might miss
the real point of reference in our discussion. Like any legal rule, its
establishment can direct parties in future cases and the way they con-
duct themselves. Accordingly, the threat of a § 1113 procedure can
pressure future parties to compromise before the law is applied by the
court. The result is that a specific balance is struck in future agree-
ments that is affected by the rules which govern the case in the ab-
sence of an agreement. Since most bargaining is made and concluded
in the shadow of the law, the effects of the rules can never be fully
estimated. In our specific context, these rules will direct employees to
make further concessions, to ease the reorganization of the company
by the DIP, and to reach agreements before they face a § 1113 proce-
that the Act does not bar the granting of injunctive relief enforcing arbitration under a
mandatory grievance adjustment or arbitration procedure).
204. Bhd. of Ry. v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co. 384 U.S. 238, 246 (1966).
205. Nw. Airlines Corp. v. Ass'n of Flight Attendants, 483 F.3d 160, 167 (2d Cir. 2007).
206. Railway Labor Act, Pub. L. No. 69-257, § 2, 44 Stat. 577, 578-79 (1926) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 152 (2006)).
207. See UFCW, Local 211 v. Family Snacks, Inc. (In re Family Snacks, Inc.), 257 B.R. 884,
899-907 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2001) (following the reasoning of the Northwest Airlines decision). See
Richard M. Seltzer & Thomas N. Ciantra, The Return of Government by Injunction in Airline
Bankruptcies, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 499 (2007) (reviewing Northwest Airlines).
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dure which, absent the strike option, becomes just a repudiation
procedure.
Lastly, a note must be made about the relation between the regula-
tion of § 1113 and the evolution of strategic, labor-related, bankruptcy
phenomena. In a Chapter 11 procedure involving the rejection of a
CBA, the question of "good faith" may arise in two different contexts.
As noted above, the question of good faith may be raised in relation
to § 1113 and whether or not the debtor attempted to resolve the
problem through bona fide negotiation with the union a reduction of
compensation. However, a preliminary question to ask is whether or
not the debtor has an honest belief that rehabilitation is necessary
through Chapter 11 at all. Historically, when a Chapter 11 stay of
proceeding was triggered for the purpose of nullifying labor contracts,
the courts dismissed the case for bad faith.208 It is ironic then that the
establishment of § 1113, with its presumed protection of the company
employees, effectively cleared the path for using Chapter 11 for this
"strategic" purpose alone, placing the issue of good faith in the con-
text of the manner in which collective bargaining was conducted.
Once the scheme is in place, it becomes hard to argue that bankruptcy
ought not to serve as a strategic choice in the context of collective
labor negotiations.
IV. THE PRESENT CHAPTER 11: GM, CHRYSLER,
AND CREDITOR CONTROL
Within the context of large corporate failures in industries with
large numbers of employees, the bankruptcies of Chrysler in April 30,
2009 and General Motors (GM) in June 1, 2009, provide a new refer-
ence point: never before has the government used bankruptcy to
bailout a major industrial corporation. For both Chrysler and GM,
the federal government used its power as a pre-petition- and DIP-
lender to influence management and to force a sale of assets and fa-
vored debt to the United Auto Workers union (UAW) and to a new,
government-owned company, leaving the remainder of the assets for
the rest of the creditors.
In Chrysler, the bail-out was accompanied by what some view as
disregard for pre-bankruptcy entitlements. Pre-petition Chrysler had
208. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Quick Charge, 168 F.2d 513, 515 (10th Cir. 1948) ("[Ilt is
difficult to escape the conclusion that the sole purpose on the part of Quick Charge in filing the
reorganization proceedings under Section 77B was to rid itself of the labor dispute with the
Union."); In re Mamie Conti Gowns, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 478, 478-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1935); In re Trinti
Constr. Co., 29 B.R. 971, 974 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1983); In re C & W Mining Co., 38 B.R. 496
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984).
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secured bank debt in secured government (TARP) loans that
amounted to about $6.9 billion. Unsecured claims of suppliers were
worth $5.3 billion. Current and former employees also had unsecured
claims, which included $9 billion to an underfunded pension fund
alone. Equity was held by Cerberus and Daimler.209
When Chrysler exited Chapter 11, the secured bank debt had been
wiped away, unsecured debts remained on its balance sheet, and eq-
uity was held by Fiat, employees, and the US and Canadian govern-
ments. Secured creditors were paid twenty-nine cents on the dollar.
In other words, while secured creditors had to be satisfied with less
than full payment, non-secured creditors, employees included, were
satisfied in full.2 10
For GM, the fourth largest bankruptcy in U.S. history,211 it took
only forty days to emerge from bankruptcy. Similarly to Chrysler, as-
sets were sold to "new GM," where the U.S. government held sixty-
percent of the shares, with the rest being held by the Canadian gov-
ernment, bondholders, and the UAW union. Holders of $27 billion in
GM unsecured bonds received stock in the reorganized company
rather than the cash they were owed. One $20 billion bondholder was
a union-controlled trust fund that took the stock to pay future retiree
health care costs. The 650,000 retirees under the union's trust had
their coverage reduced. Here as well, the government used its influ-
ence as a pre-petition- and DIP-financier (owed together around $50
billion) to dictate the outcome through a § 363 sale. However, be-
cause bondholders received payments in stock, it is less clear (than in
Chrysler's case) whether and to what extent were pre-bankruptcy en-
titlements prejudiced.
There are two ways to view these bankruptcies. The first view re-
gards these as an extreme, sui generis example of a procedure that
should not be repeated. According to the second view, these proce-
dures only highlight current practices while being within the bounda-
ries of Chapter 11. As we shall see, both views pose difficulties when
examined from an employee perspective.
Following the first view, these reorganizations are reminiscent of
the pre-Chandler Act world, where insiders and creditors with pre-
ferred access to the decision-making process could influence the out-
209. In re Chrysler, LLC, 405 B.R. 84 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
210. Mark J. Roe & David Skeel Jr., Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108 MIcH. L. REV.
727 (2010).
211. Lehmann Brothers and Washington Mutual's assets pre-bankruptcy were much larger
($719 billion and $341 billion respectively, compared with GM's $96.3 billion). See Bankruptcy
Research Database, supra note 44.
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comes, while deviating from the priorities in distribution as
established by the pre-bankruptcy entitlements.212 Indeed, in some
ways the restructuring resembles a federal agency receivership rather
than a typical Chapter 11 reorganization. 213 In Chrysler, secured cred-
itors were cashed out on less than full payment, while creditors of a
lesser priority, namely unsecured creditors and employees, remained
on the balance sheet. Employees also received equity in the new com-
pany. Furthermore, although the firm's assets were sold through an
auction, the process gave the federal government and the UAW au-
thority to review the bids prior to acceptance. This signaled that they
would outbid any competing offer and therefore eliminate such com-
petition a priori. Because this bidding process was not fully transpar-
ent and it could not accommodate further bidders, it also raised the
suspicion that it did not yield maximum returns. No mention of
§ 1129 was made by the court, meaning either that the plan could not
be confirmed in accordance with the designated procedure of
§ 1129214 or that the court did not see the reorganization as Chapter
11 reorganization at all. In GM's case, in an attempt to fit the case
into a regular Chapter 11.procedure, the court declared that
Neither the Code, nor the case law-especially the case law in the
Second Circuit-requires waiting for the plan confirmation process
to take its course when the inevitable consequence would be liqui-
dation. Bankruptcy courts have the power to authorize sales of as-
sets at a time when there still is value to preserve-to prevent the
death of the patient on the operating table.215
As we have seen above, it is less clear whether priorities were by-
passed in this process.
There are the obvious risks of rising credit costs if disregarding pre-
bankruptcy entitlements becomes common practice. 216 Furthermore,
there are anti-competitive effects when saving a particular company
rather than another within the same industry.217 Because of this back-
212. See Roe and Skeel Jr., supra note 210, at 730 ("The requirement in § 1129(a)(8) that each
class of creditors consent or receive full payment wasn't used. A market test wasn't used. There
was no judicial valuation of the firm. Chrysler went through the motions of selling its principal
assets to a newly formed entity controlled by its preexisting principal creditors, a process that has
been historically suspect in bankruptcy.").
213. See Jonathan R. Macey, et al., BANKING LAw & REGULATIONS (3d ed. 2001).
214. See Roe & Skeel Jr., supra note 210, at 730.
215. Motion for Approval of Sale of Assets to Vehicle Acquisition Holding LLC at 3, In re
General Motors Corp., No. 09-50026 (S.D.N.Y. July 5, 2009) [hereinafter Motion for Approval].
216. Deniz Anginer & Joseph A. Warburton, The Chrysler Effect: The Impact of the Chrysler
Bailout on Borrowing Costs (World Bank Policy, Research, Working Paper No. 5462, 2010),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstractid=1699612.
217. Airlines, such as British Airways, complained to the US and UK authorities that the
filings for Chapter 11 by Delta and Northwest mean they can no longer operate on a level play-
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ground, it is suggested that these cases should be confined to the spe-
cific historical circumstances. In other words, these cases should be
discussed from the unique historical perspective of the 2008 credit cri-
sis, nationalizations and bailouts, rather than in their Chapter 11 con-
text.218 From an employee perspective, placing the discussion within
the context of the 2008 financial meltdown and government bailouts
mean that such intervention cannot be expected in other contexts (i.e.
corporate collapse in a non-credit-distressed environment), even if an
industrial company is highly labor-dependent.
From another perspective, there seems to be little new in these re-
organizations. 219 In Chrysler's case, assets were auctioned while se-
cured creditors received the proceeds from the highest bidder. The
process did not disturb the Absolute Priority rule, as lower ranking
creditors received nothing. Their payment came instead from the pur-
chaser, who for social and economic reasons, decided to pay their debt
in full. In terms of Chapter 11's procedures and the sale of the assets
through § 363, the analysis confirms the description of § 363 sales pro-
vided above. 220 As we have seen, it is quite common for significant
sales of divisions and even whole companies to take place through
§ 363 of the bankruptcy code. Even if it is not clear whether or not
the highest bid was accepted, this is the case in many other § 363
sales.221 Finally, it has often been the case that a § 363 sale de facto
circumvents the § 1129 approval process, as long as the only matter
that is settled is a sale to the highest bidder and not the allocation of
rights post-sale. 222 As a matter of practice, it is common for a pur-
chaser to assume pre-petition liabilities.223 Pre-packaged bankrupt-
cies usually end quickly, making the Chrysler and GM bankruptcy
ing field. See http://www.aircargonews.com/060125/baopenmarket.html (providing a speech by
British Airways chairman, Martin Broughton, at the Wings Club in New York City on January
20, 2006).
218. See generally Roe & Skeel Jr., supra note 210, at 727.
219. See Edward Morrison, Chrysler, GM and the future of Chapter 11 (Columbia University
Workshop on Bankruptcy and Business Reorganizations, Research, Paper No. 365), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1529734; Stephen J. Lubben, No Big Deal: The GM and Chrysler Cases
in Context, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 531 (2009).
220. See supra Part III(B)(4).
221. Motion for Approval, supra note 215 (indicating that pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2006),
the expert witness valuation ranged between $0 to $1.2 billion, meaning that secured creditors in
fact received more than they would have received in a regular market driven bidding process).
222. As long as the sale was motivated by a valid business reason. Comm. of Equity Sec.
Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063, 1069 (2d Cir. 1983). Assets are sold
through a non-collusive auction process. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(n), 6004(f)(1) (permitting private
or public auction); Wintz v. Am. Freightways, Inc. (In re Wintz Cos.), 219 F.3d 807 (8th Cir.
2000).
223. Morrison, supra note 219, at 7 (noting several such cases).
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processes fast, perhaps, but not unusual. 224 Moreover, the ability of
the purchaser-government to become the dictator of business out-
comes is no different that the ability of other secured lenders, who
position themselves in a position of veto before bankruptcy ascends
(by debt purchasing) and through DIP financing (in Chrysler, the
terms of the DIP financing agreement prohibited the extension of the
exclusivity period and imposed a strict time frame for the execution of
the auction process). 225 It is accordingly argued that the government
interventions pushed the boundaries of Chapter 11 to their limits, only
to reveal the extent of power wielded by the secured and DIP lender,
and the state of the modern Chapter 11 process.
From an employee perspective, this approach simply highlights ex-
isting problems and difficulties associated with creditor control. If the
fact that the government was the financier of the procedure and the
ultimate owner of the newly formed companies can be eliminated
from the discussion altogether, then it follows that such a procedure
can be led by another third party who is not concerned with the issue
of employment protection at all. In other words, if these reorganiza-
tions only mark the direction of the evolution of Chapter 11 reorgani-
zations, nothing prevents a coalition of strong creditors, for example,
to fill the place of the government, only this time without taking such
a protective position (if any) towards the firm employees.
Indeed, viewed from the perspective of creditor control, the discus-
sion shifts into familiar waters. It is argued that since its enactment,
the control over Chapter 11 proceedings has gradually shifted from
managers to creditors. This reflects both the fact that companies enter
Chapter 11 with higher debts, as well as an ideological shift which mir-
rors the transition in power from managers to shareholders that has
taken place outside the insolvency realm since the 1970s. The mecha-
nisms which enabled this shift in power towards financial institutions
were established within the basic legal measures of Chapter 11 and
were designed to counterbalance the debtor's discretion and to guar-
antee value maximization. 226 In the post-Chapter 11 period, these
rules gave finance providers the assurance that Chapter 11 restructur-
ing protected their interests. Highly leveraged companies are com-
pelled to obtain the consent of their creditors for a Chapter 11
procedure because of these rules, yet at the price of surrendering con-
224. According to the LoPucki database, in 2007 the median pre-packaged case took forty-
three days. Bankruptcy Research Database, supra note 44.
225. See Ayotte & Morrison, supra note 132, at 27 (finding that during 2001 in two thirds of
cases DIP financiers were prepetition secured lenders).
226. See supra Part II(A) and accompanying footnotes.
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trol to these creditors. Furthermore, the "super priority status" given
to Chapter 11 financing,227 leads to strong coalitions between the fin-
ancier and the DIP, underpinned by the creation of shared control. 228
Usually, in return for the loan, the finance provider obtains influence
over the debtor during restructuring negotiations and influences the
plan that is being proposed. Sometimes the loan is repaid by ob-
taining equity in the reorganized company.229 The leverage DIP lend-
ers regularly obtain enables the imposition of increasingly severe
covenants under the finance agreement, to the point that the control
of Chapter 11 restructuring has been taken away from the bankruptcy
court and placed into the hands of the DIP financier.230
Together these measures support the management's desire to re-
main in Chapter 11 for a long period of time. At the same time it
allows finance providers to offset some of their losses through DIP
financing and to obtain control under the DIP financing contract. 231
As in the pre-Chandler Act world, investment bankers and manage-
rial elites, usually designated by the board for the specific purpose of
taking the company through Chapter 11, can bond again. The in-
crease in control of secured creditors can be traced back to the 1980s.
During the "takeover frenzy" years, many takeovers were in fact
highly leveraged buyouts (LBOs), which were enabled and facilitated
due, in part, to the changing insolvency regime. Under the new re-
gime the bidding management was no longer intimidated by the risks
associated with accumulating debt (since even if they failed, under the
rules of Chapter 11 they would not lose control). Simultaneously, the
accumulation of debts became desirable for corporate management,
since it reduced the attractiveness of their company for a potential
takeover, and thus served a similar purpose to that of a "poison pill."
From the perspective of the finance providers, LBOs and high lever-
age Mergers & Acquisitions (M&As) were financially feasible be-
cause secured creditors were guaranteed to obtain effective control in
227. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 364, 92 Stat. 2549, 2574 (1978)
(codified at U.S.C. § 364 (2006)).
228. See David A. Skeel, Jr., The Past, Present and Future of Debtor-In-Possession Financing,
25 CARDOzo L. REV. 1905 (2004) (giving examples of how DIP financiers obtain control over
the procedure).
229. See David Skeel, Creditors' Ball: The "New" New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11,
152 U. PA. L. REV. 917 (2003); Douglas G. Baird, The New Face of Chapter 11, 12 AM. BANK.
INST. L. REV. 101 (2004); Douglass G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the
Missing Lever of Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209 (2006).
230. Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Is Chapter 11 Bankrupt?, 47 B.C. L. REV. 129
(2006).
231. Skeel, supra note 229, at 918-19.
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bankruptcy.23 2 Indeed, it is suggested that secured creditors, through
financing mechanisms and other forms of control during the insol-
vency process, "hijacked Chapter 11."233 Thus, legal and market de-
velopments have combined to metamorphose Chapter 11 from its
original stated purpose of reorganization, for the benefit of unsecured
creditors and the wider community, into a federal unified foreclosure
mechanism. The debtor and its fate are controlled by secured credi-
tors aided by insiders and bankruptcy professionals motivated by sub-
stantial inducements, personal profit and shelter from liability. Within
the multilateral bargaining environment of Chapter 11, in the context
of economic decline, business realities and the need to keep the firm
in operation are combined with legal processes and dictate a power
relationship between management, capital providers, and labor. A le-
gal regime that supports the increase of control in the hands of capital
providers (pre- as well as post-petition) and management weakens the
position of the firm employees.
In sum, the current structure of Chapter 11 reorganizations, which
some claim that the Chrysler bankruptcy highlighted, illustrate how
post- and pre-petition financiers are the ultimate controllers of the
procedure and the dictators of business outcomes. If one accepts the
fact that the Chrysler reorganization only extends the boundaries of
these practices, employees should beware of assuring themselves that
the flexibility of Chapter 11 will be further utilized to protect their
interests. Absent the government as a third party "White Knight,"
these characteristics will be used to undermine rather than advance
the protection of jobs.
V. THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYEES UNDER CHAPTER 11
As we have seen above, several determinants shaped the develop-
ment of the regulations thus far. First, the view of the regulations as a
collective mechanism for creditor protection has dominated the struc-
ture and logic of Chapter 11. This view is underpinned by an ideologi-
cal vision of corporate regulations as instruments for the objective of
the maximization of the firm's value. Second, an alternative socio-
political view of the company as a vehicle upon which various stake-
holders are dependent has supported the protection of these stake-
holders. This notion underpins the introduction of the DIP
232. See SKEEL, supra note 54, at 214-16.
233. George W. Kuney, Hijacking Chapter 11, 21 EMORY BANKR. DEv. J. 19 (2004); see also
Skeel, supra note 229; Baird, supra note 229. But see Lynn M. LoPucki, The Nature of the Bank-
ruptcy Firm: A Response to Baird and Rasmussen's The End of Bankruptcy, 56 STAN. L. REV.
645 (2003).
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mechanism and more generally the legal scheme, which incentivizes
corporate reorganizations at an early stage of financial decline. How-
ever, from an employee perspective, the legitimization of the protec-
tion of multiple stakeholders undermines employee protection,
especially within the bilateral context of collective bargaining. Third,
because of the institutional setting of court competition within a fed-
eral setting, the scope for developing mechanisms for employee pro-
tection or participation in the plan preparation and confirmation
process has been very limited indeed. With this backdrop, it is
claimed that changes within one or all of these determinants may
throw the system onto a new trajectory.
Perhaps the starting point should be the ideological underpinning of
the regulations. The outbreak of the credit crisis caused a financial
meltdown worldwide on a scale unknown to anyone who did not live
through the Great Depression. It originated in the American and
British real estate markets and exposed the weaknesses of their corpo-
rate, finance, and risk regulations. Consequently, this financial crisis
has subjected the foundations of the legal and political domains to the
sort of reconsideration that has not been possible since the 1970s. For
the first time since the rise of neo-liberalism, the prevailing consensus
can and has been seriously questioned.234 As far as it concerns em-
ployee voice in the mechanisms of corporate governance and control,
the problems connected to short-term investment practices and exces-
sive risk-taking may be controlled through employee participation
that will foster, inspire, and enable strategic long-term choices. While
this claim has been marginalized over the last decades, this and similar
claims now have a new receptive environment in which to thrive.
The government's intervention in the markets and the widespread
nationalization of financial institutions that were on the verge of col-
lapse were the first signs that pointed to the scope and nature of the
changes that might take place. Based on a detailed regulatory regime,
the government's intervention was designed to alleviate the crisis and
contain it, but with the goal of withdrawing from the market once it is
stabilized. Thus, nationalization was designed to stabilize the markets
and to prevent their overhaul in the long term. At the same time,
nationalization of corporations on the verge of collapse reflected the
notion that some institutions are simply too large to be allowed to fail.
234. See, e.g., What Went Wrong with Economics?, ECONOMIST (July 16, 2009), http://www.
economist.com/node/14031376; see also The Future of Capitalism, FIN. TIMES (last visited Apr. 2,
2012), http://www.ft.comlindepth/capitalism-future (posing the following question: "The credit
crunch has destroyed faith in the free market ideology that has dominated Western economic
thinking for a generation. But what can - and should - replace it?").
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This also points towards an underlying understanding, perhaps even
an emerging consensus, that the public has a legitimate interest in
many large public corporations. Although financial institutions were
at the heart of these government-led rescues, during the crisis the gov-
ernment intervened in companies outside this industry because of the
risks to their labor force and their dependent communities. It was
these concerns that prompted the restructuring of GM and Chrysler:
the perceived public interest in the continuous existence of an impor-
tant national industry and the need to safeguard the continuation of
the health and pension funds of more than a million current and for-
mer employees. However, although the presumption that the state
does not intervene in the market when large public corporations fail
has been rebutted, government intervention can be expected to take
place only when failure occurs against the backdrop of a widespread
financial downturn. It remains to be seen whether a widespread de-
cline in a given industry, as opposed to the markets as a whole, will
allow for a government-led intervention to take place. With regard to
the development of employee voice mechanisms, as an issue directly
related to this newly found legitimization for intervention in the mar-
kets, a question remains: in what direction can these pressures be
channeled?
In the context of Chapter 11 the question that must be asked is
twofold. First, should court competition be eliminated? 235 Competi-
tion between courts over the business of the big Chapter 11 cases in
the U.S. has led to the creation of a flexible procedure in which mana-
gerial discretion was enhanced. Because control remains with pre-in-
solvency management, and is sheltered by the courts and financed
through mechanisms of shared control, employees are left marginal-
ized from the procedure.
The issue of court competition perhaps could be reduced organi-
cally, without legislation. The ability to compete in bankruptcy has
been underpinned by the social legitimization of the ideology that
supports managerial discretion and a flexible labor market. Thus, in
theory, reduced legitimization of unilateralism in management prac-
tices is directly connected to strengthening the capacity of employees
for collective bargaining within Chapter 11. Therefore, an ideological
shift may point to a subsequent change in the nature of adjudication
under Chapter 11, including the de-legitimization of court competition
itself. Whether and how changing ideological attitudes towards both
235. LoPUCKI, supra note 54 at 249-54 (discussing the various options to minimize court
competition).
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managerial discretion and collective bargaining under Chapter 11 will
and should change is a matter for careful consideration. Under cur-
rent practices, the entrance into bankruptcy has little bearing on the
ongoing trading activity of the company, apart from the value of its
shares. Thus, Chapter 11 is repeatedly hailed within the legal and fi-
nancial profession as enabling continuous trading. This could recently
be seen during the collapse of Lehman Brothers, when the offices in
London were practically abandoned once the administrator took over,
while in the U.S., business continued despite the invoking of Chapter
11.
Moreover, the credit crisis may turn out to be significant in the
sense that it altered social, managerial, and judicial attitudes towards
employees and towards dialogue with employees rather than estab-
lishing a new platform for labor legislation. Outside bankruptcy, an
emerging new consensus could encourage the propensity of employ-
ees to join trade unions. Such a change could alter both their position
outside as well as inside bankruptcy. As we have seen above, the exis-
tence of a CBA turns out to be the most important legal tool for al-
lowing employees to participate in the Chapter 11 process. Moreover,
in the bankruptcy realm, the discussion above reviewed how the abil-
ity of employees to challenge the DIP's decisions in court, particularly
relating to the business avenue which is chosen, is limited.236 How-
ever, in an altered ideological climate, the court may become sympa-
thetic to such challenges. Such challenges could be based on the
inadequate provision of information to employees or on the fact of an
employment agreement's termination rather than alteration. Thus, it
may be possible to limit the exclusivity period and power of the DIP
by challenging breaches of negotiation obligations with the union or
the lack of viable restructuring options that could have been pursued.
As always, the circumstantial nature of bankruptcy and of the com-
pany's labor structure in particular calls for flexibility in handling la-
bor disputes. If allowed, the ability to challenge the proposed plan, or
more accurately, the threat of litigation, will result in more serious
consideration of viable options to retain the employees. Thus, a new,
subtle balance between the objective of creditor wealth maximization
and the interests of employees could emerge.
Lastly, assuming that the institutional limitations for promoting em-
ployee voice can be overcome, and that a change in the prevailing
consensus will influence managerial attitudes, social perspectives of
managerial unilateralism, and judicial discretion, the additional issue
236. See supra Part III(B)(2).
2012] THE TRAJECTORY OF LABOR RELATIONS UNDER CHAPTER 11 401
of financial leverage will have to be considered. If indeed a changed
ideological climate could open the door for employees to challenge
the DIP reorganization plan, "challenging" also means presenting an
alternative. Such an alternative could be either an employee-sup-
ported bidder, a "white knight" who promises to keep the labor force
intact, or an employee-led restructuring, ending in an employee buy-
out and an employee-owned company. Employee-owned firms are
found throughout the globe, including in the U.S., and often exhibit
efficient and well-run governance institutions.237 Nonetheless, be-
cause leveraging such transactions is not within the reach of employ-
ees, these are still very much limited to small and medium-sized
companies.
In large corporations, pension funds that manage employee retire-
ment funds will have to finance such transactions. These fund manag-
ers control a great pool of workers' funds, and thus have the potential
to provide leverage and finance employee initiatives relating to alter-
native restructuring plans and corporate sales, particularly in the
bankruptcy context. Such alternatives could be of great significance
to the protection of jobs in the economy in general. Any empower-
ment of employees with effective voice must accommodate the possi-
bility of introducing alternative restructuring proposals so as to be
able to seriously challenge the decisions made by the controller. This
is of course connected to larger issues: the nature of the investments in
pension funds and whether they can and should be driven by the inter-
ests of existing employees, retirees, or the working class.
Here is where the difficulty lies. The overriding interests of the
pension fund, like any other fund managed in trust, seems not to be
the preservation of jobs, but rather, the maximization of yield on the
investment. Even if this preliminary obstacle is overcome, the real
question remains: ought we to support pension fund investment poli-
cies that are driven by the desire to maintain potentially inefficient or
even fraudulently managed companies in operation as long as it is de-
signed to keep jobs in the economy? This brings about difficult ques-
tions relating to the interests of retirees, as opposed to existing
employees, as well as the viability and sustainability of pension funds
in an aging society. As pension funds grow, so will the pressure to
channel these funds into various initiatives. At the same time, in the
next few years the sustainability of pension funds will have to be ad-
dressed by governments and the private sector.
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Increasingly, scholars are debating if and how it is possible to con-
trol pension fund holdings so as to affect corporate restructuring and
enhance corporate accountability through shareholder activism. 238 In
the U.S., to a limited extent, this has taken place already through
trade unions that were able to use their position to influence corpo-
rate outcomes.239 Critics of the idea of employee activism through
pension fund holding will point to the U.S. experience. In California,
the two largest pension funds-the California Public Employees' Re-
tirement System and the California State Teachers' Retirement Sys-
tem-have lost billions of dollars in value through investments in real
estate. Hundreds of thousands of retiring state employees now face
the choice of accepting much reduced pension checks or working past
their retirement age. With the reality of under-funded pension funds
and an aging population, the task is for the law to reconfigure so that
it will support investment policies that promote the creation of jobs
and the maintenance of viable businesses in temporary difficulties,
rather than investing in companies just for the purpose of delaying the
inevitable. In other words, solving the paradoxical division between
the interests of the employee in his retirement fund and the interests
of existing employees in their workplace is at the core of the future of
collective labor law in general and the ability to influence the out-
comes of Chapter 11 in particular.
VI. CONCLUSION
Neo-liberal ideology inspired Chapter 11 when it reduced the role
of the state, strengthened the DIP mechanism, and placed it at the
core of both small and large corporate restructuring. Nonetheless,
Congress built into Chapter 11 some balance against managerial uni-
lateralism through the introduction of various checks and balances
and the creation of a forum in which multi-party negotiations regard-
ing alternative restructuring plans for the company can take place, in
some cases even involving a trustee representative of the public inter-
est. Following the logic of value maximization, Chapter 11 also cre-
ated mechanisms of shared control between the DIP and finance
providers. Within the triangle of labor-capital-management, employ-
ees were positioned as outsiders whose interests were to be dealt with
under separate legal procedures. At the same time, Chapter 11 has
238. Simon Deakin, Workers, Finance, and Democracy, in THE FUTURE OF LABOUR LAW:
LIBER AMICORUM BOB HEPPLE OC (2004).
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Governance, 24 J.L. & Soc'y 106 (1997).
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been mooted as a "stakeholder friendly" procedure in that it encour-
ages early corporate restructuring and hence the saving of businesses.
When considering Chapter 11 in historical perspective, however, it
is evident that if Congress' intended purpose when introducing Chap-
ter 11 in 1978 was to create a balanced legal procedure, this objective
did not materialize. Because of court competition, Chapter 11 has
continuously developed to increase its attractiveness to the case set-
ters. Accordingly, by expanding and sheltering managerial discretion
and continuously undermining the plan confirmation stage, courts
have been instrumental in creating a legal framework that goes be-
yond the intended purpose of the regulation's drafters. As a conse-
quence of the strengthening of managerial discretion, in particular the
extension of time permitted for management to remain under Chapter
11's protection, market mechanisms which were subsequently judi-
cially recognized created a relationship of dependency between man-
agement and DIP financiers. As described above, this development
ultimately shifted power from management to finance providers.
An important part of the strengthening of managerial discretion has
been the avoidance of the opportunities for vesting employees with
voice. As shown above, employees, although significant stakeholders
in the firm, are not able to affect the negotiation process. Under
Chapter 11, non-unionized employees hold no influence over the deci-
sion-making process. They are treated like regular unsecured credi-
tors and their employment contract can be terminated at will. The
contract of employment, accordingly, is not treated as a different type
of contract. This decision has specific implications on the Chapter 11
context: employees do not form a separate class of creditors and their
ability to influence the restructuring plan is limited. Unionized em-
ployees, on the other hand, holding a valid CBA, are dealt with
through the detailed designated mechanisms of Chapter 11, which
Congress designed to establish the boundaries of a collective bargain-
ing process. This framework envisioned the protection of employees
and retirees against unilateral modification of their employment con-
tract. In practice, however, courts' interpretation of the scheme, de-
signed to "facilitate restructurings" to the benefit of the various
stakeholders, not solely for the protection of employees, only made it
more attractive for employers within heavily unionized industries to
undergo Chapter 11 restructurings for labor related strategic purposes
alone. This development has shifted collective bargaining from its
natural arena of labor laws designed during the New Deal era into the
sphere of Chapter 11. The strategic reorganizations of companies
under Chapter 11 force other companies within the same industry to
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undergo similar restructuring to remain competitive, thus adding to
the overall consequences of the scheme. 240 Thus, strong protections
for the DIP, combined with the prospect of retaining control over the
company at the end of the procedure, have lent Chapter 11 its attrac-
tiveness to the DIP. When a labor dispute is at the core of the proce-
dure, the fact that a CBA with multiple employers, as opposed to one
employer, can be disposed of enhances Chapter 11's attractiveness.
The ability to selectively choose which obligations the debtor wishes
to honor lends the use of Chapter 11 a competitive advantage which
further compels competitors to choose this mechanism.
An emerging new ideological consensus, driven by the recession
that began in 2008, may put pressure on courts to allow employees to
participate in the Chapter 11 negotiations, challenge a reorganization
plan, and even make their own plan of reorganization, leading to em-
ployee-owned firms.
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